Intractability and mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by Mayer, Timothy R.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2013-12
Intractability and mediation of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
Mayer, Timothy R.


















Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 









Thesis Co-Advisors:  Mikhail Tsypkin 
 Victoria Clement 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December 2013 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
INTRACTABILITY AND MEDIATION OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH 
CONFLICT 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Timothy R. Mayer 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. IRB protocol number ____________N/A_________ 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Nearly two decades following a ceasefire, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of 
Nagorno-Karabakh remains unresolved.  Often referred to as a frozen conflict, the status quo that has developed 
between these two nations has developed roots that touch many aspects of life in both countries.   
This thesis examines intractability by analyzing three distinct levels of this conflict.  It scrutinizes the reasons 
underlying failed mediation attempts since 1994 at the level of the elite, the nation, and the international structure.  It 
also explores the linkages between these three distinct levels that contribute to the complexity of conflict resolution.   
Despite periodic optimistic media reports that suggest mediators are nearing a final resolution, it will likely 
be decades before real progress can be made.  Resolution of this conflict will require a compromise between these two 
nations that may only be possible through greater democratization on both sides.  Simultaneously, the influence of 
larger states, notably Russia, have placed this regional dispute on the global stage and embedded the conflict in a 
larger polarized geopolitical contest for power and influence.  Effective mediation depends on a shift in the regional 










14. SUBJECT TERMS: Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, 
intractable conflict, mediation, frozen conflict, former Soviet Union, OSCE, Minsk Group 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
153 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 




Timothy R. Mayer 
Major, United States Marine Corps 
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1998 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 
























Mohammed Hafez, PhD  
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v 
ABSTRACT 
Nearly two decades following a ceasefire, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh remains unresolved.  Often referred to 
as a frozen conflict, the status quo that has developed between these two nations has 
developed roots that touch many aspects of life in both countries.   
This thesis examines intractability by analyzing three distinct levels of this 
conflict.  It scrutinizes the reasons underlying failed mediation attempts since 1994 at the 
level of the elite, the nation, and the international structure.  It also explores the linkages 
between these three distinct levels that contribute to the complexity of conflict resolution.   
Despite periodic optimistic media reports that suggest mediators are nearing a 
final resolution, it will likely be decades before real progress can be made.  Resolution of 
this conflict will require a compromise between these two nations that may only be 
possible through greater democratization on both sides.  Simultaneously, the influence of 
larger states, notably Russia, have placed this regional dispute on the global stage and 
embedded the conflict in a larger polarized geopolitical contest for power and influence.  
Effective mediation depends on a shift in the regional balance of power or national 
interests of regional stakeholders.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed territory of Nagorno-
Karabakh ended in a ceasefire in May 1994, after six years of fighting and more than two 
years of full-fledged warfare.  Third party mediation followed, but provided no final 
resolution.  Over the last 19 years, there have been numerous attempts at mediation 
wherein the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has taken the 
lead. In nearly two decades, there has been no substantial progress.  Moreover, there are 
indications that both parties have grown more determined to return to violence.  This 
paper investigates the factors underlying failed mediation and explores what might be 
done differently. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
The South Caucasus is a region mired in conflict, yet it holds strategic 
significance to both regional and global powers.  It is a common link among diverging 
interests.  It provides a vital source of energy to Europe and a strategic military foothold 
for Moscow.  To the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it serves as a link in 
the northern distribution network and borders Iran, a nation considered a security threat to 
the United States and its allies.1  Escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict may 
impinge on the aforementioned interests of third parties, but a renewed hostility may have 
even more severe implications.  If war again broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh, it is 
unlikely that it would remain a limited regional conflict.  In recent years, an arms race has 
developed between Armenia and Azerbaijan that would bring much more sophisticated 
and deadly weapons to the fight than were seen in the early 1990s.  The humanitarian 
crisis that would follow could overshadow the current tally of 30,000 dead and 1 million 
                                                 
1 The northern distribution network is a system of transportation corridors used to sustain military 
operations in Afghanistan from the north, thereby diversifying lines of communication and providing 
alternatives to the most direct route through Pakistan.   
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internally displaced persons since the conflict began.2  Moreover, the alliances that have 
developed in recent years may very well involve Russia and Turkey in the foray, if not 
directly then by proxy. 
Understanding this conflict, the causes of failed mediation, and the influences and 
interests of other nations involved is critical to successful diplomacy in the region.  
United States domestic political interests, which amount to a tug-of-war between the 
Armenian diaspora lobby and the commercial interest of the oil industry, should be 
balanced with broader global security concerns.  Foreign policy goals that affect the 
South Caucasus must take into account the regional balance of power that pivots around 
this conflict.  Perhaps most importantly, the influence that the United States wields 
internationally must be directed constructively within the framework of the OSCE Minsk 
Group in order to contain, and perhaps eventually resolve, this conflict. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
After two decades of mediation led by the most powerful nations in the world, the 
questions that occupy many scholars, politicians, and diplomats are what went wrong and 
what could be done differently.  Were mediation attempts flawed, if so how, and to what 
extent can these flaws be blamed for continued conflict? Has mediation outlived its 
usefulness and become stale?  Are the two parties simply going through the motions as 
though it were international theatre, having developed a habitual bias for inaction?  What 
role do other powers play in this conflict, and what are their interests with regard to 
conflict resolution?  What are the interests of OSCE Minsk Group member nations in 
continuing mediation even though it has been unsuccessful for nearly two decades?  Do 
contributing factors lurking below the surface stand in the way of resolution?  The 
fundamental question is whether this conflict is, in fact, intractable beyond the limits of 
what third-party mediation is capable of resolving.  
To understand the underlying factors behind failed mediation in this conflict one 
must look deeper than simply outlining the reasons that specific proposals were 
                                                 
2 Philip Gamaghelyan, “Intractability of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Myth or a Reality?,” 
Special Report, Peace & Conflict Monitor (2005): 1. 
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unsuccessful or the superficial reasons why each nation is unwilling to compromise.  
Research into this dispute has found that this conflict is rooted at three distinct levels, 
where it has continued to evolve since the 1994 ceasefire.  Analyses at the levels of the 
elite, the nation, and the international structure reveal how actors at these distinctive 
levels view the conflict differently.  All three levels respond differently to changing 
circumstances in the ongoing conflict and attempts at mediation, yet they are also 
interconnected.  The linkages between these three levels have evolved in ways that 
reinforce each other to maintain a status quo of frozen conflict.  
At the international level, the role played by large regional powers, as well as the 
United States, is significant in preventing effective mediation and perpetuating this 
conflict.  At this level, the conduct of both conflicting parties largely conforms to what a 
realist paradigm suggests.  Alliances and partnerships have formed along predictable 
lines based on individual state interests, and competition for the leading role in mediation 
has developed among these nations who are interested in gaining greater regional power 
and influence.  In this way, a venue for forum shopping has been established wherein 
both countries can seek alliance with mediators sharing common interests.  A balance of 
power in the realm of mediation mirrored the balance of power among states on the 
international stage.  This bipolar structure created competition for power, in terms of 
access and resources, thereby preventing mediators from using leverage to establish 
incentives for compromise.   
Power and interests of third parties at the international level contribute to the 
influence of the ruling elite in Armenia and Azerbaijan.  Both nations’ alliances with 
larger powers have provided them economic, military and political support that has 
allowed the ruling elite to maintain their entrenched positions.  The international conflict 
inhibits democratic reform and legitimizes the authoritarian regimes on both sides of the 
dispute.  The political and economic elites, more concerned with power and wealth than 
conflict resolution, rely on maintaining the status quo to stay in power.  
The power and control of the autocratic regimes in both countries, combined with 
the ongoing threat of renewed war, reinforce the nationalistic sentiments within the 
societies of Armenia and Azerbaijan.  Politics is firmly rooted in ethnic nationalism on 
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both sides of the dispute, and political competition in these partial democracies provides a 
venue for unremitting nationalistic propaganda.  Militarism is deeply entrenched at the 
national level, and an escalating arms race is fueled by money funneled away from 
societal reforms and democratic institution building.  For both nations, this dispute has 
become part of a national identity that has strengthened over time and maintains a high 
degree of social inertia. 
Intractability in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh is the product of a deeply 
interconnected structure that links disparate actors at different levels of the conflict, each 
with their own motivations, to a shared interest in maintaining the status quo.  Moreover, 
conflict at each level contributes to factors at other levels that further cement existing 
conditions.  For this reason, failed attempts at mediation cannot be attributed to any 
single factor, and long-term resolution is a complex undertaking.  Single-track 
approaches that focus on the international considerations of the conflict have been 
insufficient, yet under the current conditions, attempts at multi-track diplomacy that 
could have greater influence on society have been unable to gain traction.   
While renewed conflict is not a foregone conclusion, the likelihood of another 
war is realistically higher than expecting positive results from 20 more years of OSCE 
mediation in its current form.  Nonetheless, the Minsk Group has maintained dialogue 
and kept alive the diplomatic structure that has provided a political outlet through which 
both countries can air their grievances on the international stage without escalating the 
conflict. Eventually, the geopolitical balance of power will shift for reasons one has yet to 
imagine.  As the interests of regional powers change there may be an opening in which 
mediators will be able to gain the necessary leverage to bring about a peaceful settlement.  
As unproductive as it appears in this case, diplomacy should not be put on hold.  A 
structure for talks must remain in place and mediators need to be ready to act decisively 
when the conditions are right.  Ongoing passive mediation by the Minsk Group can keep 
diplomatic channels open and defuse interstate tension while maintaining a watchful eye 
on regional shifts of power.  In the meantime, promoting and incentivizing democratic 
reform in both nations is essential for creating the conditions that can bring lasting peace.  
 5 
Compromise by either nation will remain elusive as long as autocratic regimes continue 
to rely on this ongoing conflict to maintain power and legitimacy. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most literature addressing the topic of mediation and conflict resolution in the 
case of Nagorno-Karabakh focuses on two general areas: the ethnic/nationalistic roots of 
the conflict and the attempts by third parties to mediate the conflict.  Analyses that 
focuses on mediation are divided by those scholars who believe that the mediators 
themselves are the source of the problem and those who believe that intermediaries have 
adopted the wrong approach to mediation.  The way in which the problem is framed in 
each of these three categories often leads authors to suggest solutions that are blind or 
contradictory to concerns outside the limited scope of their analysis. 
Those authors who address the ethnic and nationalistic roots of the conflict view 
the problem through the lens of liberalism or constructivism. Scholars that represent this 
viewpoint include Thomas de Waal, David Laitin, Ronald Suny, Philip Gamaghelyan, 
and Ceylan Tokluoglu.  Their approach to resolution is attentive to the national and 
individual levels of analysis and focuses on the perceptions of the Armenian and 
Azerbaijani populations.   
Thomas de Waal asserts “the Nagorny Karabakh conflict makes sense only if we 
acknowledge that hundreds of thousands of Armenians and Azerbaijanis were driven to 
act by passionately held ideals about history, identity and rights.”3  He also proposes that 
the conflict remains unresolved because of the “local dynamics and calculations of local 
actors rather than the conduct of international mediators and the format of negotiations.”4   
David Laitin and Ronald Suny agree with de Waal in a widely held belief that 
“the origins of the current conflict are shrouded in the mists of the twentieth century,” 
and assert that conflict resolution requires that Armenians and Azerbaijanis set aside their 
local perceptions and extreme nationalism that blossomed after independence from 70 
                                                 
3 Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War (New York: New 
York University Press, 2003), 272. 
4 Thomas de Waal, “Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process,” Survival 52, no. 4 (2010): 160. 
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years of Soviet rule.5 They assert that only the political conditions of the mediations 
prevented agreement and not the structure of the conflict itself. 6  
Philip Gamaghelyan contends that the conflict is rooted in issues of identity and 
profound mistrust based on historical events. He proposes a broad range of liberalizing 
reforms to address these issues while fostering cooperation.  His recommended reforms 
include democratization, reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey, and integration of 
the regional economic and security infrastructure. Gamaghelyan believes that promoting 
greater integration will create a cohesive pan-Caucasian identity that will supplant 
national identities and dampen the effects of ethnic conflict.7 
Ceylan Tokluoglu examines the political discourse of Azerbaijani elites and 
discovers not only negative perceptions of Armenians but also a general distrust of all 
countries with interests in the region, including Turkey, which has a profoundly negative 
impact on conflict resolution. Tokluoglu’s viewpoint diverges from the other 
constructivist opinions in that he has a more realistic understanding of the difficulty in 
enacting policy aimed at changing perceptions.  He concludes that the current political 
narrative blocks interstate communication and reduces the likelihood that any attempt by 
outsiders could have a positive impact while this conflict is ongoing.8 
The difficultly with a constructivist approach to conflict resolution in the case of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, that Tokluoglu mentions, is that barriers to communication and 
entrenched viewpoints, typical of states at war, provide no way for an outside party to 
directly interject.  The aforementioned authors who posit a solution that revolves around 
changing perceptions, paradigms, and values offer no realistic way in which this could be 
done.  Their methodology will undoubtedly be vital for long-term stability in the region 
                                                 
5 David D. Laitin and Ronald Grigor Suny, “Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way Out of 
Karabakh,” Middle East Policy VII, no. 1 (1999): 146. 
6 Ibid., 158. 
7 Gamaghelyan, “Intractability of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Myth or a Reality?,” 1–13; Philip 
Gamaghelyan, “Rethinking the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Identity, Politics, Scholarship,” International 
Negotiation 15, no. 1 (2010): 34–54. 
8 Ceylan Tokluoglu, “The Political Discourse of the Azerbaijani Elite on the Nagorno-Karabakh 
Conflict (1991–2009),” Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 7 (2011): 1223–52. 
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but poses no prospect for brokering a peace agreement that would prevent further 
escalation in the short-term.  Until political and geographic barriers associated with the 
ongoing conflict are reduced, there are limited opportunities for changing the 
belligerent’s perceptions of one another. 
International mediation, as an instrument for maintaining communication and 
reducing barriers to resolution, is a critical topic surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict.  Mediator bias is a theme that many authors invoke as a contributing factor in 
this diplomatic impasse.  Several articles across the spectrum of literature make reference 
to the bias of mediators in this conflict, particularly with regard to Russia being the most 
biased.  Bahar Baser and Wendy Betts succinctly address this valid but perplexing 
problem.  Two interrelated aspects surround mediators and their biases in this conflict.  
First, biased mediators may be more concerned with furthering their individual national 
interests than with resolving the conflict.  Second, a plethora of willing and capable 
mediators creates competition among them and an opportunity for forum shopping by the 
parties to the conflict.  Each party can align with a mediator they feel will offer them the 
most favorable position in a resolution.9   
Bahar’s and Bett’s arguments are valid and backed up by prominent scholars of 
conflict mediation such as William Zartman, Saadia Touval, Chester Crocker, Fen Osler 
Hampson, and Pamela Aall, but in most cases mediators will have a bias.  Mediation is an 
instrument of foreign policy, and if another state did not have an interest in the outcome 
of the conflict there would be no incentive for them to participate.10  According to Greig 
and Diehl, 95 percent of all mediation by international organizations and 85 percent of all 
state sponsored mediation has been unbalanced.11  Parties to a conflict are usually more 
                                                 
9 Bahar Baser, Third Party Mediation in Nagorno Karabakh: Part of the Cure or Part of the Disease? 
(Saarbrücken, Germany: VDM Publishing, 2008); Wendy Betts, “Third Party Mediation: An Obstacle to 
Peace in Nagorno Karabakh,” SAIS Review 19, no. 2 (1999), 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v019/19.2betts.html. 
10 Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall, Turbulent Peace : The Challenges of 
Managing International Conflict (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 428, 507. 
11 J. Michael Greig and Paul F. Diehl, International Mediation (Malden, MA: Polity, 2012), 75. 
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interested in a mediator’s ability to produce an attractive outcome than its neutrality.12  
Baser, Betts and others, who reference the problem of mediator interests and competition, 
are framing the problem around the mediation and failing to appreciate the larger balance 
of power at the structural level.  In blaming biased mediators for failed mediation, Baser 
ignores the structural element of state interests in international relations.  Similarly, Betts 
concludes that a greater level of cooperation between the United States and Russia would 
resolve the difficulty in mediation.13   
The approach third parties take toward mediation is another significant category 
of literature on resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  There are a great number of 
works on the general theory of mediation that contributes to understanding options 
available to third party intermediaries.  Forms of mediation are characterized by the level 
of involvement by the third party, ranging from conciliation to power mediation, and 
escalate in involvement from simply establishing communication between the disputants 
to coercively manipulating the situation to force an outcome.14 
Mediations by the OSCE Minsk Group over the last two decades have been 
predominantly passive in character, taking a “pure mediation” form to use Greig and 
Diehl’s terminology.15  The OSCE has directed the focus of talks and have offered 
innovative solutions, but have not applied leverage in the form of “carrots or sticks” to 
externally incentivize an agreement.16  Most critics of the OSCE’s mediation efforts 
argue that more involved power mediation is required.   
Thomas Ambrosio suggests that the United States is in a relatively unbiased 
position with the leverage to support more active measures toward reconciliation, but he 
admits that the country lacks the political will to follow through on its stated goals of 
                                                 
12 I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, “International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power 
Politics,” Journal of Social Issues 41, no. 2 (1985): 27. 
13 Betts, “Third Party Mediation.” 
14 Greig and Diehl, International Mediation, 7–9. 
15 Ibid., 8. 
16 Ibid., 9. 
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fostering peace in the region.17  Wayne Merry is a proponent of “old-fashioned great-
power collusion,” and suggests that Turkey should be invited to play a more active role in 
mediation.18  These arguments, while valid, present a problem similar to biased 
mediation by glossing over the significance of a state’s interest in mediation and 
discounting the issues of competition, forum shopping, and balance of power.  The lack 
of political will on the part of the United States, that Ambrosio notes, is a function of the 
state’s relative interest.  Until circumstances in this conflict change, through either a shift 
in the balance of power or relative interest, the probability of successful mediation will 
remain quite low. 
Notably absent in the extensive literature on this topic is a discussion of how the 
contemporary roles of large powers influence conflict resolution on the larger 
international stage.  Michael Croissant comes the closest in his balanced historical 
assessment.  He discusses the influence of nationalism at the state level and the 
geopolitical competition among larger states, but he draws no linkage between them.19  
Croissant’s book was also published just four years after the ceasefire.  In the past 15 
years, a great deal has evolved on the international stage that has continued to reshape 
this conflict.      
Understanding the elements of the global power structure that influence this 
ongoing dispute, and the threads that connect different levels of analysis, can provide a 
breadth and depth in appreciating the apparent intractability of this conflict.  A broad 
understanding encompasses the extent to which regional and global powers influence this 
conflict, and a deep examination refers to how changes at the international level affect the 
perception of key leaders and subsequently ripple through society. 
                                                 
17 Thomas Ambrosio, “Unfreezing the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict? Evaluating Peacemaking Efforts 
under the Obama Administration,” Ethnopolitics 10, no. 1 (2011): 93–114. 
18 Wayne Merry, “Karabakh: ‘Frozen’ Conflict Nears Melting Point,” Open Democracy, May 14, 
2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/wayne-merry/karabakh-frozen-conflict-nears-melting-
point; Thomas de Waal, Wayne Merry, and Sergey Markedonov, panel discussion moderated by Ross 
Wilson, “Russia’s Aims and Priorities in Nagorno-Karabakh,” The Atlantic Council of the United States, 
October 1, 2012, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/in-the-news/russias-aims-and-priorities-in-
nagornokarabakh-10-1-12-transcript. 
19 Michael P Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Publishers, 1998). 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Research has been conducted as a case study to investigate the most significant 
factors contributing to failed mediations in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  This study 
investigates the conflict at three distinct levels, that of the elite, the nation and society, 
and the international structure and draws conclusions that may inform future foreign 
policy toward this region.  
Analysis at the level of the elite, society, and the international structure is focused 
on determining what can be accomplished by outside actors in bringing about resolution. 
Attention will be given to those elements of international relations that potentially 
influence parallel levels of analysis at the individual and national level.  The interaction 
between international policy, individual decision-makers, and the civil society in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan is assessed through the lenses of the liberalism and 
constructivism perspectives appropriately.  
Materials for this research have been limited to sources available in the English 
language and includes foreign policy documents, scholarly books and articles, media 
reports, and analysis and reports prepared by organizations with interests in this region.  
This protracted conflict has strongly influenced the literature that has been written on the 
topic over the last quarter century and has led to varying levels of bias in virtually every 
domain.  Consideration has been given to the potential nationalistic viewpoint of every 
source.  Bearing in mind that not all statistics or factual accounts are available from 
opposing sides, this thesis attempt to distill rhetoric from reality and present both 
viewpoints when they are discovered.  The intent of this paper is to present an unbiased 
assessment of the conflict. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
To understand why mediation has been unsuccessful, it is necessary to understand 
the complex structure of the existing status quo between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  This 
thesis is organized into six chapters that provide the theory and history behind this 
intractable conflict and explain the conflict from three distinct levels of analysis. 
 11 
Chapter II introduces the theoretical framework that explains the concepts that 
appear in the chapters that follow.  Discussion of theory will include a brief introduction 
of the three prominent schools of thought in international relations theory: realism, 
liberalism, and constructivism.  A discussion of the levels-of-analysis approach to 
problem framing also sets the stage for understanding the different layers of this conflict. 
Chapter II concludes with a discussion of mediation with multiple mediators and its 
effect on mediators’ leverage. 
Chapter III presents an overview of the conflict and its recent history.  The 
historical overview will explain the circumstances leading to ethnic friction between the 
nations of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the conditions that led to the formation of 
Nagorno-Karabakh as an autonomous republic.  The narrative illustrates the critical 
events through dissolution of the Soviet Union and the conduct of the war, the multiple 
attempts at mediation, and the circumstances faced by both nations as the war ended 
under the 1994 ceasefire.   
Chapter IV explores the conflict at the level of the elite and the nation.  It 
examines the development of post-soviet domestic politics in each country and explains 
the rise of competitive ethno-politics that continues to perpetuate the current conditions.  
The influence that the ongoing frozen conflict has had on society is illustrated as a 
contributing impediment to conflict resolution.  Chapter IV also describes the prospective 
roles of economic integration, informal diplomacy, and concludes by discussing the 
importance of democratic reform in resolving this conflict. 
Chapter V addresses the conflict at the international level.  It discusses different 
approaches to mediation in this conflict and the role that mediators have played.  The 
chapter highlights the interests of large powers surrounding this conflict, alliance 
formation by Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the influence of the international structure on 
resolving the conflict over this disputed territory.  It concludes by discussing the 
significance of the international system as a barrier to effective mediation. 
Chapter VI illustrates the interconnectedness of the conflict at its three distinct 
levels and how conflict at each level reinforces the present status quo at the other levels.  
 12 
The application of different theoretical approaches to various aspects of the conflict is 
reevaluated by looking at the conflict in aggregate.  Chapter IV concludes by providing 
recommendations for a new long-term strategic approach to conflict resolution. 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Referring to the origin of a dispute as a seed of conflict is not only a poetic 
metaphor but also a fitting analogy.  Some seeds are carefully cultivated while others find 
fertile soil on their own.  Many never germinate at all, even under the most favorable 
conditions.  The seed itself determines what type of plant will emerge, but conditions 
beyond the seed determine how the sprout will grow.  Conditions in the garden will affect 
the life of the plant, but so will the environment outside of the garden.  The influence of 
sun, rain, and wind are all beyond the gardener’s control.  The circumstances and 
conditions under which a seed was planted can become less significant over time.  A 
gardener that no longer wants a tree growing in the middle of his garden cares little about 
how it was planted.  He can no longer simply dig up the seed or sapling and must now 
deal with a deeply rooted tree producing more seeds of its own.  The circumstances that 
lead to conflict are not necessarily the same conditions that allow it to grow, and the 
growth that has taken place is impossible to undo.  Like the metaphorical garden, the 
growth of the seeds of conflict into open warfare takes place at more than one level with 
different factors influencing each plane of development.  Understanding the origin of an 
intractable conflict is important but it is only the first step toward finding resolution.   
This chapter begins by introducing the theory behind a levels-of-analysis 
approach to international relations theory that provides three distinct perspectives in 
framing different aspects of a conflict.  Drawing on the combined effects of all three 
levels of a conflict, the concept of intractability is explained along with the significance 
of mediation in such conflicts.  The motives and rationale for mediator involvement in a 
conflict is explored as well as the complexity that may develop when multiple third 
parties are involved in mediating a conflict.  Finally, this chapter explains the detrimental 
effects of multiple mediators’ conflicting interests in the mediation process, how it may 
diminish mediation leverage, and how diverging interests among major powers can 
contribute to a conflict’s ongoing intractability.     
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A. LEVELS-OF-ANALYSIS APPROACH 
Kenneth Waltz proposes a levels-of-analysis approach to international relations 
theory that may be used to systematically divide aspects of conflict between influences 
and perceptions of the decision-making elite, civil society at the national level, and the 
international system.20 Under the rubrics of this method the individual leader is best 
examined through a constructivist lens, the national level of analysis conforms primarily 
to the paradigm of liberalism, and the international system is governed by realism.  
Viewpoints overlap to some extent between the individual and national levels, leading 
Waltz to combine them in his later work.21  Nonetheless, these different elements are 
theorized to respond discriminately to different circumstances while together forming the 
broad composition of the conflict. 
1. The Level of the Individual 
At the level of the decision-making elite a constructivist lens is applied to 
understand the motivations and decisions that precipitate conflict.  Constructivism is 
based on the belief system, norms, values, and identity held by individuals.  This 
principle dictates that a person’s actions toward objects and other actors are based on 
individually held perceptions.  The decisions that an individual makes are based on their 
unique understanding of reality and how they view themselves and others. These 
perceptions, while influenced by the conditions of their surroundings, are socially 
constructed.  Moreover, increased interaction and socialization with another actor will 
alter an individual’s perception toward that actor and subsequently reshape the social 
structure as well as an individual’s self-identity.  Alexander Wendt argues, “Realism is a 
self-fulfilling prophecy.”22  States that instinctively view other powers as threats will 
create in them an adversary. In this regard, conflict may emerge or resolution may remain 
elusive based on socially constructed narratives that perpetuate misperceptions of an 
                                                 
20 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War; A Theoretical Analysis (New York,: Columbia 
University Press, 1959). Waltz refers to three images rather than levels in his analysis. 
21 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
22 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 
International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 410. 
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adversary.  Misperception, it can be said, is the mother of war.  If both sides of a conflict 
have a clear understanding of their adversary’s intent, their strength, and the support they 
will receive from their allies, war is much less likely.  Frequently, an adversary’s hostile 
intentions are exaggerated, as are one’s own military capabilities.23 
2. The Level of the Nation 
At the level of the nation and civil society the fundamentals of constructivism still 
have a part to play, but the liberalism paradigm emerges as the principal model.  
Liberalism provides a bottom-up view of politics wherein the demands of society, based 
on rational and risk-averse pursuit of wealth and welfare, are the primary influences on 
international relations.  This paradigm relies on the assumption that government policy is 
accountable to society, and that through this relationship societal preferences become 
national interests.  It asserts that conflict is a result of pursuing a state preference that 
exerts a negative externality on another state that the other state is unwilling to pay, based 
on a cost/benefit analysis.  The economic strand of liberal theory ties societal preferences 
to economic interdependence among nations, suggesting that integrating commerce can 
maintain a stable peace.24  In this respect, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye believe that 
complex interdependence between nations will preclude military engagement.  They 
assert that in addition to mutual economic interdependence, “social and cultural 
globalism” contribute to a sense of interconnectedness that has a peaceful and stabilizing 




                                                 
23 Jack S. Levy, “Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War: A Levels-of-Analysis Approach,” in 
Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A Crocker, Fen Osler 
Hampson, and Pamela R Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 18; Wendt, 
“Anarchy is What States Make of It,” 396–98, 403–10. 
24 Norman Angell, “The Great Illusion,” in Conflicts after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War 
and Peace, ed. Richard K Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2008); Stephen G Brooks, “The Globalization of 
Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 5 (1999); 
Robert Owen Keohane and Joseph S Nye, Power and Interdependence, Fourth Edition ed. (New York: 
Longman, 2012). 
25 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 228. 
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differences in fundamental beliefs (borders, culture, or distribution of public goods), 
competition over scarce resources, or asymmetric distribution of power or social 
influence.26 
Based on the aforementioned principles, liberalism theory emphasizes that 
“politics does not end at the waters’ edge,” and for this reason domestic politics can play 
a central part in interstate conflict.27  The diversionary theory of war contends that 
humans are territorial creatures that easily attach social and emotional value to territory, 
and that these attachments become ingrained in their sense of national identity.  When 
this happens, territorial dispute becomes a zero-sum equation where compromise is 
unthinkable and military action is seen as the only way to control a coveted parcel of 
land.  Leaders and influential elites can exploit the resultant in-group versus out-group 
conflict to create an external scapegoat for domestic problems.  Leaders may promote a 
historical myth that exalts their own national history and legitimacy while dehumanizing 
an adversary.  Officials may gain political support through bellicose rhetoric or offensive 
military action.  Large ethnic migrations may ensue, either as a matter of policy or for 
self-preservation, leading to greater cultural homogeneity in one group while creating 
greater social conflict and strains on resources, due to resettlement of refugees or 
internally displaced people, in another.28  
3. The Level of the International System 
The international system is most frequently modeled through the paradigm of 
realism.  This perspective is based on an understanding that states of the world exist in a 
larger anarchic realm, devoid of any higher authority.  Machiavelli introduced the 
concepts behind realpolitik at the beginning of the sixteenth century in terms of interest 
and necessity.  Each state decides on its own the conditions under which it finds violence 
necessary to protect its interests, and therefore war may erupt at any time.  While war is a 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 20-21; Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics,” International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 516–21. 
27 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 20. 
28 Levy, “Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War,” 15–17; Jaroslav Tir, “Territorial Diversion: 
Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict,” Journal of Politics 72, no. 2 (2010): 415–17. 
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relatively infrequent occurrence, the amount of interaction between states guarantees that 
wars will sometimes occur.  Violence does indeed occur in states where laws are written 
and enforced prohibiting it, so it is implausible that under the framework of any 
international system where enforcement is absent there will not also be violence.  
Kenneth Waltz asserts, “No human order is proof against violence.”29  In this self-help 
system, the only way to ensure the security and prosperity of a state is to maintain or 
enhance its strength; therefore, the greatest interest of all states is power.  Only once 
security is assured can a state seek other goals.30 
Balance of power theory suggests that states, as unitary actors, take measures, 
internally and externally through all means available, to maintain or advance their 
position in the international system with the goal of preserving the state.  In the face of 
greater powers, states will balance internally by increasing their economic and military 
strength, developing protective policy, and cultivating shrewd strategy.  Externally, states 
will attempt to develop strong and large alliances and take measures to thwart other states 
from doing the same.  Whereas Waltz contends that states balance against greater powers, 
Stephen Walt suggests that states, as a matter of survival, will more often balance against 
states they feel are more threatening as a function of power, proximity, capability, and 
perceived intentions.31  
Walt maintains that ideological solidarity is a contributing factor in alliance 
formation.  Political, cultural, and ethnic similarities, while secondary to state survival, 
can influence a state’s choice of ally.  Furthermore, he explains that ideological 
considerations are more important when states are relatively secure.  Therefore, alliances 
that enhance security while also providing ideological solidarity should prove stronger 
than those that are based on security alone.  Walt also explains that exaggerating the 
                                                 
29 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 103. 
30 Ibid., 102–03,17, 22. 
31 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, 
no. 4 (1985): 8–12; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 118. 
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importance of ideological ties can be self-fulfilling if policies are adopted that favor 
similar states as friends and punish dissimilar states as enemies.32  
Regardless of the subtle variations in theories of alliance formation, alliances are 
ultimately formed on mutual interests.  In the words of Lord Palmerston, states have “no 
eternal allies and no perpetual enemies, only interests that are eternal and perpetual.”33  
These state interests, in terms of security and power, invariably come in conflict with one 
another, as one state’s security becomes another state’s vulnerability.  A state that 
expands its military forces for its security is seen by other states as threatening.  Other 
states meet this security dilemma by building up their own forces, creating a spiral model 
of deterrence against one another, which can result in an arms race among states.  In what 
Waltz refers to as the “tyranny of small decisions,” states make many shortsighted 
choices in the interest of security that ultimately create further obstacles to their 
security.34  In this regard, realism dictates that the structure of the international system 
has the largest influence on interactions between states.  War occurs, in part, because of 
unintended consequences of state action that is more concerned with immediate security 
than extending influence.35 
Factors that contribute to war seldom, if ever, exist at just one level.  While each 
level of analysis should be framed independently through the appropriate paradigm, 
factors from each level will contribute to perceptions at other levels.  In this way, 
complex conflicts that strongly resonate at multiple levels can become deeply entrenched, 
or intractable, over time. 
                                                 
32 Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” 18–26. 
33 David Brown, Palmerston and the Politics of Foreign Policy, 1846–1855 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2002), 82–83. 
34 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 111. 
35 Levy, “Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War,” 7; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 58-77; Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics, 107–11. 
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B. INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 
Many scholars and authors use the term intractable to imply that a conflict may 
never be solved.  In this context, such a term could potentially doom efforts toward a 
peaceful resolution.  There are, however, many conflicts throughout the world that are 
significantly more challenging than others to bring about an accepted solution. Crocker, 
Hampson, and Aall do not hesitate to label these as intractable conflicts, with the 
understanding that, while they pose significant obstacles, they are not impossible to 
resolve.36 
Every conflict is unique, but most intractable conflicts have some elements in 
common.  Parties to a conflict take political solutions seriously only when the cost of 
continued fighting is believed to outweigh its benefits. While this shift can take place 
from changing circumstances of the conflict, a change in political elites, or when the 
public becomes tired of ongoing violence, in intractable conflicts this shift in the balance 
between cost and benefit does not happen. The conflict may not sufficiently hurt the 
elites, a sufficient number of people may benefit from the status quo, and conflicting 
interests may stand as barriers to negotiations. Leaders or elites whose political careers 
benefit from supporting popular nationalistic beliefs may also protract the conflict. 
Similarly, compromise may be inconceivable to leaders, leaving unconditional victory as 
the only acceptable solution.  Past experience in failed negotiations is also a significant 
factor contributing to intractability in future negotiations.  While it may appear that no 
mutually acceptable solution exists, it is often the case that such a solution does exist but 
it has already been rejected or discredited during a time that was not ripe for negotiation.  
Putting such options back on the table are exceedingly difficult for mediators and may 
invite staunch political opposition domestically among the conflicting parties. Other 
factors contributing to intractability include the abundance of military resources on both 
sides of the conflict; lack of security mechanisms such as effective monitoring, 
verification or confidence-building measures; and interests of third party states in 
perpetuating the conflict. While intractability results from the interaction of variables at 
                                                 
36 Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall, Taming Intractable Conflicts: 
Mediation in the Hardest Cases (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2004), 7. 
 20 
the individual, national, and international levels, most intractable conflicts are only 
resolved with considerable outside assistance through mediation.37  
C. MEDIATION 
Mediation is a voluntary, non-binding, arrangement of assistance given to two or 
more parties to a conflict by at least one third-party that has no authority to impose the 
terms of a settlement.  The object of mediation is to help conflicting parties, who retain 
control over the outcome, come to a settlement without resorting to violence.  Mediation 
as a method of conflict resolution has grown substantially over the course of the last 70 
years, particularly at the end of the twentieth century.  In a 55-year period leading up to 
1999, Michael Greig and Paul Diehl recorded 2,632 mediation attempts pertaining to 
1,702 conflicts.38  Of these, 64 percent took place in the 1990s compared to just 2.2 
percent in the 1940s and 3.2 percent in the 1950s.39 While mediation has grown in 
popularity, each case is still a unique and complex undertaking.  Of all mediated conflicts 
in the same period more than 35 percent required multiple attempts by the same mediator, 
and 37 percent of all mediation revolved around just 10 of the 1,702 conflicts.40 Given 
the voluntary nature of mediation, the resources expended by mediators, and the political 
credibility at stake, understanding motivations for both mediators and parties to a conflict 
to take part in mediation, particularly in an intractable conflict, is an important part of 
understanding the evolving nature of the conflict itself.41 
There are a variety of responses that outside parties could take to an intractable 
conflict.  They could leave the conflict alone and let war take its course, engaging only 
when it is in the vital interest of their own national security.  Conversely, large powers 
such as the United States could involve itself in any or all conflicts with the hope of 
creating a more stable world.  The most sustainable and productive approach is 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 7–9, 186. 
38 Greig and Diehl, International Mediation, 32, 49. 
39 Ibid., 32–33. 
40 Ibid., 48–49. 
41 Ibid., 4–6. 
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somewhere in between.  Third parties that engage in mediating conflicts do so for 
strategic reasons as an instrument of their foreign policy.42  
Conventional wisdom suggesting that mediators should be disinterested, 
impartial, or neutral is unsubstantiated in theory and in practice.  Mediators may engage 
defensively to protect economic interests and relationships or to increase their own 
security and regional stability.  They may also act offensively in order to influence the 
terms of the settlement in their favor, establish trust and recognition from one or both 
parties that will increase their standing in regional relationships, or prevent a rival state 
from gaining an advantage by intervening.  Frequently outside states engage in mediation 
for a combination of offensive and defensive reasons.  All else being equal, conflicts that 
attract the most mediators are those that represent strategic national interests to large 
powers.43 
Parties to a conflict accept mediators for the same reasons that mediators seek 
involvement: they believe it will be in their best interest.  Both parties may not entirely 
agree on a mediator, but objections may be withheld if one party feels that rejecting the 
mediator may harm their chances of resolution.  A mediator’s impartiality is shown to be 
less important to conflicting parties than their ability to produce results.  Mediators who 
favor one side are frequently seen as beneficial agents of compromise who can deliver 
their favored side to a solution that both parties can agree on.44  
Mediation is complex and involves a three-way relationship as conflicting parties 
seek the most advantageous position against one another as well as the mediator.  While 
mediators attempt to persuade each belligerent to make concessions that will resolve the 
conflict, mediators are also pursuing a strategy of their own.  Therefore, one must 
recognize that actual conflict resolution may not be the highest priority among 
                                                 
42 Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, Taming Intractable Conflicts, 13; Saadia Touval and I William 
Zartman, “International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era,” in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of 
Managing Internal Conflict, ed. Chester A Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R Aall (Washington, 
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 428. 
43 Greig and Diehl, International Mediation, 78; Touval and Zartman, “International Mediation in the 
Post-Cold War Era,” 428–29. 
44 Touval and Zartman, “International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era,” 432–33. 
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prospective third party mediators, regardless of their stated aims.  Third parties may be 
more interested in maintaining a status quo that would not pressure an ally (or potential 
ally) to make significant concessions or put pressure on separate bilateral interests.45  
D. MULTIPLE MEDIATORS 
Single state mediators are increasingly rare in longstanding, intractable conflicts, 
adding another dimension to the already complex dynamics of mediation.  When working 
together, multiple mediators can balance the inherent biases among mediators, enhance 
leverage, isolate mediators with conflicting interests, increase international legitimacy, 
and divide costs and risks, but these benefits come at a price.  Competition among 
mediators for the parties’ attention can complicate communication and contribute to 
misperceptions among the parties about their positions, commitments, capabilities, and 
the structure of a process that the international community is willing to support.  
Cooperation and good communication among multiple mediators are critical in 
maintaining constructive mediation.46 
When mediators fail to properly communicate, when competing interests interfere 
with cooperation, or when additional would-be mediators attempt to interject themselves 
into the process, the conditions are favorable for forum shopping by the conflicting 
parties.  Rather than adhering to a unified process, parties will side with the mediator who 
is most sympathetic to their position or offers the most favorable conditions.  As 
circumstances change throughout mediation, parties may change favored mediators more 
than once. When major powers’ conflicting strategic interests, dictated by the structure of 
the international system, create the conditions for forum shopping many elements of 
leverage required for effective conflict resolution are lost.47 
                                                 
45 Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, Taming Intractable Conflicts, 23–25. 
46 Ibid., 88–90; Greig and Diehl, International Mediation, 71–72. 
47 Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, Taming Intractable Conflicts, 89–90; Greig and Diehl, International 
Mediation, 72–73. 
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E. LEVERAGE AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS 
Leverage, or power, is the cornerstone of mediation and comes in a variety of 
forms.  The first element of leverage is the mediator’s ability to garner the support of 
other states that will stand behind the process and restrain those states that could obstruct 
progress.48  Mediators with conflicting interests are each likely to gain the most support 
from states that share the same or similar interests, thereby polarizing the conflict further 
and spreading it to the larger regional or global stage.  Lack of unity in mediation, and the 
resultant forum shopping, gives the belligerents power over the established mediators in 
determining whom they will work with.  Keeping out obstructionists or any other would-
be mediator is in the hands of the conflicting parties.   
The second and most pivotal function of leverage pertains to the balance of power 
between the parties to the conflict.  Drawing on the outcome of a stalemate, a mediator 
must convince the parties that a military solution is not in their best interest.49 In the case 
of an intractable conflict, that has experienced long-standing ceasefire or prolonged low-
intensity conflict, the outcome of the original stalemate becomes increasingly irrelevant.  
Conflicting mediators and other large regional or global powers competing for the 
parties’ attention through military, economic, or political support can erase the effects of 
the historical stalemate and perpetuate a belief that resolution can be achieved without 
compromise. 
Conventionally, an intermediary may attempt to use his power to establish 
bilateral agreements that put pressure on both parties in a balanced way so that pressure 
on one side does not result in an advantage by the opposing side.50  Under the 
circumstances created by mediator competition and polarized strategic interests, neither 
mediator may have sufficient pressure on both parties to bring about substantial results.  
Should one mediator attempt to apply pressure alone, they risk falling out of favor with 
the parties and losing their place at the table.  Even if an agreement were possible among 
                                                 
48 Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, Taming Intractable Conflicts, 94. 
49 Ibid., 94–95. 
50 Ibid., 95. 
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all mediators, with strategically neutral objectives, the collective action problem could 
prevent them from following through.  If one side fails to comply with the arrangement 
their favored side in the dispute could emerge at a strategic advantage. 
Leverage may come in the mediator’s ability to influence the cost versus benefit 
calculation and insecurity concerns by both sides through conflict monitoring, 
information sharing and security guarantees.51  This form of leverage demands unity of 
effort among mediators to portray an accurate depiction of the military and political 
situation, and it requires trust by both parties to accept this information as fact.  
Independently, mediators’ interests in the terms of a settlement, or a stronger relationship 
with one party over the other, could influence their perception of costs and benefits or 
contribute to a hesitance in sharing critical strategic information.  Furthermore, either 
party may be reluctant to accept security guarantees that involve peacekeeping forces 
provided by a mediator that does not share their long-term strategic interests. 
An effective third-party broker must be willing to expend resources and call on 
international support to maintain security throughout the peace process, and both parties 
must believe in the mediator’s resolve.52  The uncertainty of resolution in an intractable 
conflict and its long duration may be exacerbated by strategic competition and drain a 
mediator’s domestic political will.53  Mediators may expend sufficient resources to 
maintain their strategic position, but the collective action problem may inhibit a state 
from exhausting resources or credibility on a conflict that does not impinge directly on its 
national security.  There is an inherent unknown return on investment in mediating an 
intractable conflict, and interstate competition of unknown duration may contribute to a 
conservative allocation of blood and treasure.  The parties may interpret this cautious 
approach toward economic and political capital as a lack of resolve on the part of the 
mediators. 
                                                 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 16. 
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To maintain leverage, a third-party must be able to force both sides to make 
difficult choices toward compromise and be willing to see those decisions through.54  For 
a mediator in a complex scenario of conflicting interests, finding compromise while 
maintaining a productive relationship with one or both parties is a difficult proposition.  
Networks of political, military and economic support from other influential powers can 
prevent mediators from creating a dilemma that forces either party to a make a critical 
decision. 
Leverage stems from the parties’ need for a solution and the belief that the 
mediator can provide results, the receptiveness of the parties to pressure from a mediator, 
and the parties’ interest in incentives or disincentives (carrots or sticks) that the mediator 
may present.55 Mediators cannot effectively promise to one side more than the opposition 
will concede, therefore overall leverage in conflict resolution is limited by the side that 
experiences the least pressure from the mediator’s power.56 If the mediators have more at 
stake in mediation than the parties do, if the parties can counter or redirect pressure from 
a single mediator, or if the parties can shop independently among multiple mediators for 
the most favorable incentives, the conflicting parties are in a position to exploit the 
mediation process to their own advantage and stifle progress toward resolution. 
F. CONCLUSION 
A seed of conflict may be planted at the individual, national, or international 
level, but if a conflict is allowed to grow it will strengthen and adapt to interaction at 
other levels.  Conflicts that powerfully resonate in all three areas may, over time, become 
intractable.  Resolution, in these cases, depends on international involvement through 
mediation.  Mediators emerge as foreign policy actors first, concerned primarily with 
their own strategic interests.  Frequently the interests of mediators coincide with the 
interests of the conflicting parties, and a mediator’s leverage is sufficient to change the 
balance in favor of a lasting solution.  Occasionally, there are multiple mediators who 
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have conflicting interests at stake in the mediation process.  When mediators, particularly 
large powers, are unwilling to compromise on the terms of a settlement, the overall 
leverage available to all mediators is diminished.  In this case, the mediation process, and 
sometimes the conflict itself, becomes entrenched in the wider geopolitical strategy of the 
major powers whose interests are at stake.57 
Intractability is not a static condition but an ongoing, self-perpetuating, cycle with 
conditions at each level of a conflict influencing factors at other levels.  While a lasting 
peace depends on resolution at all levels of the conflict, outside influence through 
mediation is limited at its very onset.  The preliminary role of a third party in mediation is 
to break the cycle by altering the thought process of the decision making elites while 
temporarily reducing the uncertainty inherent in the anarchic international system.  When 
mediators fail to accomplish these goals the conflict remains unresolved, but if mediators 
or other major powers engulf the conflict in a larger strategic contest the conflict grows 
more intractable. 
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III. HISTORY OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Nagorno-Karabakh is an Armenian-populated mountainous territory about the 
size of the Grand Canyon National Park, precariously located within Azerbaijan.58  
Conflicting territorial aspirations over Nagorno-Karabakh grew alongside ethnic conflict 
that emerged in the years leading up to Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s statehood in 1918.  
Throughout World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, and Russian Civil War, larger 
nations exploited this ethnic conflict in pursuit of their own strategic interests.  As the 
Soviet Union took shape, Nagorno-Karabakh was given autonomy within the Azerbaijani 
Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR).  Beginning in 1988, when Soviet authority was 
weakened under the policy of Glasnost, nationalist sentiments were reborn in both 
republics and spiraled into violent conflict centered on Karabakh.  Following the fall of 
the Soviet Union the conflict escalated to full-scale war.  Fighting continued until there 
was a Russian-brokered ceasefire in 1994 between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the de facto 
government of Nagorno-Karabakh.  The war ended with Armenians controlling Nagorno-
Karabakh and seven surrounding districts that account for just less than one-fifth of the 
territory of Azerbaijan.  In the 19 years since the ceasefire, there have been numerous 
mediation attempts, but no final peace has been negotiated between the parties.  
Furthermore, the parties to the conflict never reached agreement on a peacekeeping force.  
The ceasefire has been maintained only by the restraint of the parties themselves.  The 
resulting situation of no war and no peace has been referred to as a frozen conflict.  
Unfortunately, strategic posturing by both Armenia and Azerbaijan indicate that the only 
thing that is frozen is the peace process. 
This chapter provides a historical chronology that illustrates the depth of this 
conflict relating to the development of national identities, the actions and beliefs of 
military and political leadership that supported popular nationalist sentiments, and the 
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interaction with international actors.  This account provides a background to the factors at 
the individual, national, and international level that contribute to the conflict’s 
intractability.  The territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh is deeply rooted in issues of 
ethnic identity and nationality, both of which have been formed over the course of this 
long conflict.  Political elites whose careers have survived the turmoil carry their 
nationalistic sentiments with them to higher offices.  On the international stage, larger 
states, sometimes unwittingly, create conditions that foster ethnic conflict, perpetuate 
violence, or fail to support a resolution when the opportunity presents itself.  The effects 
of the conflict at all three levels combine synergistically to perpetuate the cycles of 
intractability that exist today. 
B. HISTORICAL HOMELAND 
The geography of the Caucasus, as a land bridge between continents, has made it 
a heavily trafficked region and natural battleground in clashes between expanding 
empires.  Having endured Persian, Roman, Arab, and Turkic occupation over the 
centuries, the region has experienced significant ethnic and cultural mixing.  The Roman 
Empire brought Christianity to the region in the fourth century, and Islam took root with 
the Arab occupation in the seventh century.  Having experienced such cultural 
amalgamation, it should come as no surprising that Armenia and Azerbaijan can both find 
evidence supporting a historical claim to a small piece of territory in the center of it all.59  
Armenia stakes its claim to Nagorno-Karabakh as part of the vast Armenian 
kingdom existing perhaps as early as the fourth century BCE.   Azerbaijan’s claims date 
back to the same era, although the name Azerbaijan did not emerge until the twentieth 
century.  Azerbaijani roots can be traced back to the Caucasian Albanians that occupied 
the region before the ascendancy of the Roman Empire in the Caucasus.  After 
occupations by several empires, Azerbaijani Turkic language and culture was clearly 
distinguishable by the sixteenth century under the Iranian Safavid Dynasty.60  
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Over centuries, the Armenian and Azerbaijani cultures developed on different 
paths shaped by different influences.  Distinguishable cultural characteristics, particularly 
in language and religion, developed among Armenians earlier than other ethnic groups of 
the region.  These differences set them apart as a minority in occupying empires and 
made them a target for persecution.  The experiences of oppression had a lasting 
influence on the cultural identity of the Armenian people and contributed to ethnic 
solidarity and a sense of protectionism.  Azerbaijanis adopted a common language and 
religion later than Armenians, and therefore did not experience the same unifying 
pressures.  Their belated development of nationality fostered closer integration with the 
people of conquering empires giving them a more diverse culture but further delaying the 
development of a solidified identity.61 
Scholars on both side of the dispute contest the other’s claim that Nagorno-
Karabakh is their historical homeland.  Historians that support Armenia’s claim assert 
that Karabakh was predominantly Armenian populated when the Russian Empire 
captured it in 1805, following the Russo-Iranian War.  Azerbaijan claims that it was 
Armenian immigration from Iran following the war, allowed by a provision in the 1828 
Treaty of Turkmenchay, that led to an Armenian ethnic majority in Karabakh.  When 
Iranian territory was brought under the Russian Empire, administrative boundaries were 
redrawn. The former Khanate of Karabakh was expanded to include additional territory 
to the east and was subsequently renamed Elisavetpol Guberniia.  Owing to the 
geography of the land, this expanded boundary tied the mutually dependent mountainous 
and pasture communities together to accommodate semi-nomadic herders, facilitate 
transportation, and enhance economic cooperation.  The remainder of Armenia was not 
annexed until 1826, thus separating Armenians between the two empires for 21 years.62 
C. CONFLICT IS BORN 
Nearing the end of the nineteenth century, the policies of the Russian Empire 
favored Armenians over Azerbaijanis.  Armenians were typically city dwellers that 
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occupied more lucrative positions in society whereas Azerbaijanis were predominantly 
rural unskilled laborers.  As an example of this, when the state monopoly on the oil 
industry was lifted in 1860, oil land was purchased predominantly by elite Russians and 
Armenians.63  Of 54 oil firms in Baku by 1888, only two were Azerbaijani-owned.64  
Similarly in politics, while Azerbaijanis made up more than 80 percent of those who 
would qualify for suffrage based on income, they held less than half the seats in local 
government due to the restrictions placed on non-Christians.65  During this period 
Azerbaijani nationalism was first inspired by the small but influential Azerbaijani 
intelligentsia in the form of Pan-Turkism, a phenomenon that started in the Ottoman 
Empire and spread from Eastern Europe to Western China.  While the root of discontent 
between Armenians and Azerbaijanis was buried in Russia’s pro-Christian policies, 
Azerbaijanis did not view Russia as the culprit.  Instead, Azerbaijani identity was born in 
an environment that promoted ethnic hatred for their perceived Armenian oppressors.66  
Ethnic tension that had built up boiled over in 1905.  When Russian authority in 
the South Caucasus diminished during the first Russian revolution, wide scale ethnic 
violence erupted along parallel class and ethnic lines.  In February, Baku saw riots that 
left hundreds dead on both sides.  Fighting simultaneously erupted in Yerevan, spreading 
to Nakhichevan in May and Shusha by June.  In September riots reemerged in Baku 
where Armenian industries were attacked and oil wells were burned.  In the course of a 
week, fighting left 1,500 dead and 1,026 of 1,609 oil wells demolished.67  Total 
casualties from these prolonged riots are estimated between 3,100 and 10,000.68  A 
cautious peace was restored only at the end of the year when the revolution collapsed.69  
                                                 
63 Altstadt, Azerbaijani Turks, 21. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 25. 
66 Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, 8; Svante E Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: 
A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus (RoutledgeCurzon, 2001), 56. 
67 Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, 9. 
68 Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, 56. 
69 Altstadt, Azerbaijani Turks, 40–41; Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, 55–56; Croissant, 
The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, 9. 
 31 
The events of 1905 were the first demonstrations of violence between Armenians 
and Azerbaijanis and brought an ethnic conflict to the surface that has continued for over 
a hundred years.  Inaction on the part of Russia to stop the violence created insecurity on 
both sides and fostered desires to take actions that would protect local interests.  
Armenian revolutionaries focused their attention on asserting autonomy in historically 
Armenian dominated territory, specifically Nagorno-Karabakh.  For the Azerbaijanis, 
1905 promoted a sense of solidarity through mutual suffering that fueled a nascent 
nationalist movement.  Armenian irredentist sentiments, combined with bloodshed and 
resentment, fed a growing sense of Azerbaijani community and reinforced the 
development of an anti-Armenian identity.70 
D. STATEHOOD 
Following the October revolution of 1917, in the midst of World War I, 
Bolsheviks ordered Russian troops out of the Caucasus, leaving favorable conditions for 
the Turkish Army to take back territory lost to Russia during the war.  For reasons of 
mutual security in the subsequent power vacuum, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan came 
together to form the Transcaucasian Commissariat on 30 October, which became the 
Transcaucasian Diet by March 1918. With support from France and England, the 
Transcaucasian Commissariat established small armies they hoped would defend it 
against the Ottoman Empire.71  
The newly formed diet had its first order of business in early March in reaction to 
the recently signed Brest-Litovsk Treaty, whereby Bolsheviks forfeited the 
Transcaucasian provinces of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum to Turkey to get Bolshevik 
Russia out of the war.  Denying the legitimacy of the Bolshevik brokered treaty, the diet 
attempted to renegotiate its own settlement. In order not to violate the treaty, Turkey 
insisted that the diet declare independence before negotiating.  Infuriated, the diet 
declared war on 13 April but lost Batum to the Turks the next day.  On 22 April, the 
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Transcaucasian Diet complied with Turkish demands, declaring independence as the 
Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic, and resumed negotiations.  Three days 
later the new federation surrendered Kars to Turkey, but before negotiations were 
complete Turkey demanded the provinces of Erivan and Tiflis as well, on the grounds of 
treaty violation.72 
The threat posed by Turkey’s unrelenting demands led to the collapse of the 
federation.  Georgia declared independence on 26 May in order to form a pact with 
Germany for protection in exchange for mineral resources.73  Azerbaijan, fundamentally 
opposed to raising arms against a fellow Turkic Muslim people, also declared 
independence, having all the while maintained a separate delegation in an attempt to 
convince the Ottomans to recognize them as independent.74  One week later, Azerbaijan 
signed a treaty with the Ottoman government to provide military support.75  Armenia, on 
its own, negotiated the 4 June Treaty of Batum with the Ottoman Empire, in which it lost 
Kars, Ardahan, and portions of the Tiflis and Erivan Governorates to Turkey.76  
Determined to connect the Ottoman Empire to the Caspian Sea, the Turkish Army, aided 
by the Azerbaijani Army of Islam, continued its advance across the Caucasian isthmus to 
capture Baku on 15 September 1918 and maintain control of the Caspian land bridge until 
the Mudros Armistice on 30 October.77  The Caucasian states had been thrust into 
independent nationhood to survive amid the power struggle of larger nations and set on 
paths of diverging interests through their alliances with opposing powers.    
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E. THE CONFLICT OVER KARABAKH EMERGES 
By June 1918, external borders of the Caucasian states were outlined, but borders 
between the three were yet undefined.  The tentative peace that existed for nearly thirteen 
years ended in August of 1918 when Azerbaijan announced it would delimit its borders 
and include Karabakh.78 Up to that time, both Armenia and Azerbaijan laid claim to the 
region, citing their respective official maps as justification.79  Facing mounting Armenian 
opposition, the Azerbaijani government was supported by the Turkish Army that marched 
on Shusha on 7 October.80  With little resistance, Azerbaijan took control of Karabakh, 
but with limited troops it could only effectively control Susha and the road to Agdam.81   
The end of Ottoman participation in World War I led to the deployment of British 
troops to the Caucasus.  When British troops took the territory formerly held by the 
Turks, they adopted the same policy on Karabakh.  They quickly determined that people 
were too intermingled to draw an accurate ethnographic border that would please 
everyone.82  In border disputes that erupted concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, the British 
prerogative was to maintain the status quo and support the existing tsarist structure of the 
gubernii.83  Significantly fewer in numbers than the Turkish Army, the British deployed 
with the intention of supporting self-determination of the people, and attempted to limit 
their influence on political decisions, although this is not how it always worked out.84  
While concerned about the strategic issues of German propaganda, the pan-Islamic threat, 
and later the Soviet involvement in Indian trade routes, the British were also keenly 
interested in establishing access to Baku’s oil; therefore, they needed to maintain a 
friendly relationship with Azerbaijan.85  
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F. AZERBAIJAN ASSERTS CONTROL 
Azerbaijan, under British authority, took the next step toward controlling 
Karabakh, on 15 Jan 1919, by dismissing Armenian General Andranick Ozanian.  Amid 
Armenian protests, Kurdish Azerbaijani governor, Khosrov Bek Sultanov, was appointed 
provisional governor-general of Karabakh. The meetings of the Fourth and Fifth 
Assembly of Karabakh Armenians in February and April both officially rejected 
Azerbaijani rule, insisting on being included into the Armenian Republic. Thereafter, the 
British consented to Azerbaijan using more domineering methods to gain compliance.86 
Azerbaijan’s forcible approach to Karabakh began on 20 May, when Sultanov 
enacted a blockade that cut the mountains off from the steppe while Kurdish irregular 
troops, loyal to Sultanov, mounted attacks on Armenian villages. On 4 June 1919, 
Sultanov moved Azerbaijani troops into Shusha, attempting to force out the Armenian 
militia.87  While British forces interrupted widespread violence, Sultanov was adamant 
about the removal of Armenian forces. The next day, Sultanov ordered an attack on 
nearby Armenian town of Khaibalikend, thereby putting an end to Armenian defiance. 
Departure of British troops on 10 August 1919 left Armenians without a mediator in the 
dispute, although by the end the British showed little remaining Armenian sympathy.88   
The seventh Assembly of Armenians of Karabakh signed an agreement in August 
that delineated the division of power between Karabakh and Azerbaijan and gave 
Karabakh a semi-autonomous status. Armenian nationalists were upset with Karabakh for 
giving in to Baku, and Azerbaijan was dissatisfied with the autonomy arrangement, 
preferring unconditional ownership of the territory.89   
From late 1919 through early 1920, Azerbaijan’s legitimacy over Karabakh grew 
within the international community, leading to a renewed effort to incorporate the 
territory.  In the summer of 1919, Colonel W.N. Haskell, an Allied high commissioner 
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and representative of the U.S. State Department, visiting Baku as a non-partisan 
diplomat, declared that Karabakh should belong to Azerbaijan.90  Early the next year the 
Paris Peace Conference, upholding an earlier Entente policy, affirmed Azerbaijan’s right 
to govern Karabakh.91  Based on the outcome in Paris, Sultanov attempted to incorporate 
Karabakh into Azerbaijan.  The Eighth Assembly of Karabakh Armenians met on 28 
February, at Sultanov’s request, and rejected outright any possibility of integration with 
Azerbaijan, citing violations of the August 1919 agreement.92   
G. ARMENIAN REBELLION / SOVIET INVASION 
After the outcome of the Eighth Assembly, Armenians in Karabakh were 
concerned about a reprisal by Sultanov reminiscent of the previous spring.  Their fears 
appeared to have materialized on 11 March when a report claimed 90 railway trucks 
filled with troops had left Baku for Karabakh. On the night of 22 March, Armenians put 
into motion a long anticipated rebellion, but the uprising was a failure, capturing only one 
Azerbaijani position at Askeran pass. Azerbaijani forces countered by burning down 
Armenian-populated areas of Shusha. Over the next 10 days, fighting continued with 
more Azerbaijani troops breaking through the Askeran Pass to occupy Shusha. The 
timing of the rebellion and the Azerbaijan military response could not have worked out 
better for the Soviet Red Army.93 
While the majority of Azerbaijani military forces were engaged in Karabakh, 
Bolsheviks took the opportunity to seize the undefended city of Baku.  On the morning of 
28 April 1920, Soviet forces established authority in Baku and claimed Azerbaijan as 
Soviet territory. The next day, Sultanov proclaimed himself chairman of the 
Revolutionary Committee of Red Karabakh.  The new Baku soviet presented an 
ultimatum to Armenia: If Armenian troops were not withdrawn from Karabakh, the 
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Republic of Azerbaijan would consider itself at war with the Republic of Armenia.  Once 
the Red Army forces were consolidated in Baku, Moscow put military expansion 
operations on hold due to the concurrent Polish offensive in Ukraine. The Red Army was 
ardent about continuing Sovietization and expanding control of the land bridge to Turkey, 
but was restrained by Moscow’s freeze on troop movements.  Exploiting the ethnic 
conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, Chairman of the 
Caucasian Bureau attached to the Eleventh Red Army, recruited Azerbaijani Bolsheviks 
and encouraged them to continue their military operations to claim Karabakh, Zangezur, 
and Nakhichevan.94 
H. SOVIETS EXPAND AS WORLD WAR I ENDS 
Soviet expansion continued westward with Azerbaijani recruits and elements of 
the Red Army entering Shusha on 12 May, ostensibly to stop Armenian-Tatar massacres. 
When forces arrived, local Azerbaijani army units in Karabakh became Red Army units, 
and Sultanov was dismissed.  While fervent in their struggle against Azerbaijan, 
Armenians of Karabakh did not attempt to resist the same troops marching under the flag 
of the Red Army, largely because it brought an end to Sultanov’s oppression.95  
On 10 August the Ottoman Empire and the Allies signed the Treaty of Sevres that 
delineated a new border between Turkey and Armenia, giving a portion of eastern 
Turkish territory to Armenia.  The Turkish nationalist movement had no intention of 
abiding by the Treaty and saw an opportunity to defy the Allied powers while building 
relations with the Bolsheviks.96   
In late September 1920, Turkish troops invaded Armenia. By early November, 
Turkish forces advanced as far as Alexandropol. Armenia surrendered to Turkey and 
negotiated the terms of the Treaty of Alexandropol, whereby Armenia would relinquish 
all territory lost in the war.  In a move that by all appearances was well choreographed, 
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the Red Army eagerly stepped in between the crumbling Armenian government and 
Turkey to assist in negotiations. Armenians surrendered to Bolshevik control without 
bloodshed on 1 December.97 
I. THE BORDER COMMISSION DELIBERATES ON KARABAKH 
In the spring of 1921, the newly formed border commission began deliberation of 
boundary disputes, and Karabakh was at the top of the list.  The commission decided on 3 
June 1921 that Nagorno-Karabakh would belong to Armenia, and on 12 June the 
Armenian government accepted a decree signed by Alexander Myasnikyan stating the 
same. There are conflicting historical accounts of Azerbaijan participation at the meeting 
of the border commission.  While some sources claim that Nariman Narimanov, the 
leader of the Soviet Government of Azerbaijan, was present at the meeting, others assert 
that the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist party had no involvement and 
remained unaware of this decision until it was published in Armenian newspapers on 15 
June. By all accounts, the final decision had not been agreed upon before newspapers 
published this story, and Narimanov was not pleased with the interim decision.  A 
telegram sent to Narimanov 25 June from Sergo Ordzhonikidze and Sergey Kirov stated 
their opinion:  
In order to resolve all the frictions and to establish truly friendly relations 
when solving the question of Nagorno-Karabakh it is necessary to be 
guided by the following principle: not a single Armenian Village should 
be attached to Azerbaijan, equally not a single Muslim village should be 
attached to Armenia.98   
Narimanov rejected the decision, arguing from a logistical standpoint that 
economic ties and administration would be adversely affected and should be considered 
over ethnic reasons for the borders, and elevated the decision to the Caucasus Bureau.99 
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J. THE CAUCASUS BUREAU DECISION ON KARABAKH 
After two days of deliberation, the Caucasus Bureau met on 4 July 1921, with 
Stalin, as Commissar of Nationalities, voting in favor of Karabakh going to Armenia. 
Narimanov again objected and insisted that the bureau push the decision to Moscow. The 
next day, in a curious turn of events most likely directed by Stalin, the bureau reversed its 
decision and adopted a new plan more agreeable to Narimanov. Karabakh would remain 
within the Azerbaijan SSR as an autonomous region. Narimanov, still not pleased, 
opposed even autonomy for Karabakh and asked the Caucasus Bureau to delay and 
reconsider assigning a commission to study the need for autonomy. After two years of 
debate, and under pressure from the Transcaucasian Regional Party Committee, 
Karabakh was granted autonomy on 7 July 1923.  The official boundary decision took 
place in no less than five separate discussions leading to a final statute on 26 November 
1924.100 
K. THE DORMANT CONFLICT IS REBORN 
Under communist rule, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was mostly 
suppressed, only coming to the surface when pressures on civil society reduced or 
political change was afoot.  Karabakh Armenians sent several letters and petitions to 
Moscow requesting to be incorporated into the Armenian SSR in 1964 and 1965 during 
the post-Stalinist thaw of the Khrushchev era.  Letters were also sent in 1977 during 
discussions over a new Soviet constitution.  The last petition, sent in the summer of 1987, 
contained more than 75,000 signatures and was followed up by two delegations of 
Karabakh Armenians traveling to Moscow to discuss annexation to Armenia.101   
Ethnic violence between Azerbaijanis and Armenians appeared to spontaneously 
spring from the ground in 1988, with the Soviet government seemingly unaware of the 
level of turmoil simmering over the previous seven decades.  Initially, threats and 
violence went unreported in the media, even as Azerbaijanis began fleeing Armenia in 
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late 1987 and early 1988.102  By February 1988, when a third Armenian delegation 
arrived in Moscow, activists were already taking to the streets.  Protest in Karabakh set 
off protests throughout Armenia that began under the cloak of environmental concerns 
but quickly changed to issues of nationality.  Armenia was experiencing a national 
awakening and at the center of this phenomenon was Nagorno-Karabakh.103 
 Seven days into the Armenian protests, Baku started buzzing in political 
opposition to Karabakh’s irredentist rhetoric.  On 20 February, when the Karabakh SSR 
voted to secede from Azerbaijan, Baku crowds hinged on riot.  City officials stepped in to 
reassert authority, and one of the measures taken to ensure stability in Baku was blocking 
entry to the city by would-be rioters.  Among the blocked routes was the road from 
Sumgait, upon which a great number of working class Azerbaijanis traveled every day to 
their employment in Baku.104 
L. VIOLENCE ERUPTS IN SUMGAIT AND ECHOES THROUGHOUT 
BOTH REPUBLICS 
The Kremlin responded to the Karabakh petition on 23 February, refusing the 
request to unite with Armenia.  Concerned about damaging inter-ethnic relations, 
Gorbachev blamed “hooligan elements and anti-perestroika forces” for the uprising.105  
Three days later, protests began in Sumgait marking the first reported incidents of 
violence in the renewed conflict.  That evening, a Soviet television news broadcast that 
covered the ongoing protests in Karabakh made note of two Azerbaijani men that had 
been killed five days prior.  The response to this news the following day in Sumgait was 
tremendous.  Over three nights, 29 Armenians and six Azerbaijanis were killed, hundreds 
were injured, and 5,000 Armenians sought shelter in the Palace of Culture in Sumgait’s 
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Lenin Square.106  Almost all Armenians subsequently left Sumgait never to return, nearly 
14,000 in total.107  Throughout Azerbaijan, Armenians were leaving by the thousands.108  
Protests and violence continued in both Armenia and Azerbaijan over the course 
of 1988 leading to death, destruction, and large ethnic migrations.  Armenians organized 
a strike on 3 July near Yerevan to disrupt operations at the nearby Zvartnots airport, to 
which Soviet troops responded by killing two and injuring more than 40.  Protests 
emerged in Baku on 17 November over the government’s weakness and inability to 
reassert control over Karabakh, representing a new level of Azerbaijani national 
awakening.  The next day, rallies formed throughout Armenia again calling for 
unification with Nagorno-Karabakh.  On 21 November, when the USSR Supreme Court 
announced a death sentence to an Azeri man who took part in the Sumgait riots, a new 
round of pogroms ignited wherein remaining Armenians were forced out of Baku and 
Ganja.  By the end of November, the last Azerbaijanis residing in Armenia were also 
expelled.109  
M. EARTHQUAKE DEVASTATES ARMENIA AND RUSSIA FACES THE 
ETHNIC PROBLEM 
Nearing the end of the year, the forces of nature finally pressured the Kremlin to 
react to ethnic unrest.  A magnitude 6.9 earthquake struck Armenia at 11:41 am on 7 
December.  The initial quake was followed by several aftershocks leaving massive 
damage in several cities, up to 25,000 dead, and hundreds of thousands without 
homes.110  Gorbachev paid a visit to the devastated region three days later and faced an 
angry crowd.  Adding to their bitterness with Moscow’s response to Karabakh, the people 
were further upset with such a delayed and inadequate government response to such a 
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devastating emergency.  On 12 January 1989, Moscow’s late response to the ethnic 
turmoil was to implement social reforms aimed at improving the Karabakh economy and 
social services.  A Russian Official, Arkadiy Volsky, was appointed by Moscow to take 
over the direct administration of the oblast and oversee the development program.   
Anything short of unification with Armenia fell short of appeasing the growing Armenian 
nationalist movement, and the loss of sovereignty over the territory also fomented 
discontent in Azerbaijan.111   
N. THE CONFLICT BECOMES POLITICAL AND INCREASINGLY 
MILITARISTIC 
Over the course of 1989, fighting became more intense and militaristic while the 
ethnic dispute gathered political strength.  Nationalist political parties in both Armenia 
and Azerbaijan were congealing their base of supporters, and Karabakh became the 
central issue of domestic politics.  Armenia had not yet recovered from the devastating 
earthquake when renewed fighting emerged in the streets of Stepanakert and Mardakert 
in Karabakh.  In July, Armenia enacted a blockade on Azerbaijan’s exclave of 
Nakchivan.  Azerbaijan retaliated with an embargo on Armenia.  On 28 November, in 
what appeared to many a signal of defeat, the Soviet direct command was relieved, and 
Karabakh was again left in the hands of Azerbaijan.  Armenia promptly responded to the 
changing situation by officially declaring itself reunited with Nagorno-Karabakh on 1 
December.112 
The next year opened with Armenian parliament voting on 9 January 1990 to 
include Nagorno-Karabakh within the Armenian SSR state budget, a move that further 
infuriated Azerbaijan.  Attacks were launched in retribution on Armenians living in the 
Khanlar and Shaumian regions.  The Azerbaijan Popular Front staged rallies in Baku’s 
Lenin Square beginning on 6 January that were put down the next day by Soviet troops 
numbering in the thousands.  Just four days later, radicals from the Popular Front 
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captured the Party buildings in Baku effectively overthrowing Soviet power.  The 
pogrom in Baku that followed was reminiscent of previous violence in Sumgait, 
producing at least 88 Armenian casualties and inciting the last major wave of ethnic 
cleansing.113  Over the following days, thousands of Armenians were transported to 
Turkmenistan by ship or to Yerevan by air.114 
The Kremlin imposed a state of emergency on Nagorno-Karabakh, the city of 
Ganja, and along the Armenian-Azerbaijan border on 14 January.  Based on concerns 
over the rising power of the Azerbaijan Popular Front, the decision was made to extend 
the state of emergency to Baku on the night of 19 January.  Poor communication by the 
military to the population and severe indiscriminate use of force on the part of the Soviet 
forces led to the deaths of 130 Baku citizens in a single night.115  Responding to Soviet 
brutality, the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet issued Moscow an ultimatum: remove all Soviet 
troops from Azerbaijan or Azerbaijan would secede from the union. Moscow dismissed 
Azerbaijan’s threat, imprisoned several Popular Front leaders, and established martial law 
in Baku under the enforcement of a Soviet troop occupation.  Meanwhile, Armenia was 
embittered by what it viewed as a trend of too little—too late by Moscow.  Soviet troops 
stood idle during the worst atrocities only to launch a botched intervention once the 
violence was over.116 
In Armenia, 1990 saw marked growth in political support for Armenian 
nationalists in politics while separate parallel developments were occurring among 
military forces.  On 4 August, Armenia elected its first non-communist leader, Levon 
Ter-Petrosyan from the Armenian National Movement (ANM).  Only weeks later, on 23 
August, the Armenian parliament passed a resolution on national sovereignty, marking a 
significant movement toward independence.  A number of unofficial militias emerged 
over the course of the year and grew to compete in power with political leadership.  
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Militia operations became focused on capturing arms and ammunition from the Soviet 
military, while some reports suggest Armenia was also receiving arms shipments from 
abroad and transporting them to Karabakh.117 Growth of militias and organization of 
troops was not limited to the Armenians.  The year the followed marked a distinct shift in 
the type of violence between the two parties.  What had been relatively unorganized and 
localized fighting in prior years was turning into more intense contact between structured 
armed units.  Controlling the inertia of armed Armenian militias proved to be Ter-
Petrosyan’s greatest challenge in subsequent years.118 
O. OPERATION RING 
The results of the March 1991 Soviet referendum on the preservation of the union 
shifted Moscow’s support heavily in favor of Azerbaijan both politically and militarily.  
Azerbaijan participated in the referendum, voting for the continuation of the Soviet 
Union.  Armenia was among the six republics that abstained, announcing that it would 
instead hold its own referendum on independence in September.  Moscow’s reaction to 
Armenian dissent was to put pressure on one of Armenia’s critical vulnerabilities, the 
Armenian population within Azerbaijan.  Operation Ring, a joint Russian Army and 
Azerbaijan police operation, was launched on 30 April ostensibly to halt illegal Armenian 
migration into Azerbaijan.  An operation designed to deter the movement of armed 
factions resulted in nothing less than a small civil war that violently forced Armenian 
civilians to leave 24 villages on the northern border of Karabakh.  Azerbaijani refugees 
that had previously fled Armenia were repopulated in the villages left vacant by 
Operation Ring.119   
Operation Ring was an Azerbaijani military victory but a political defeat.  
Moscow’s intent to dissuade Armenia from seeking independence was not realized, and 
Karabakh Armenians became further hardened against any possibility of living under 
Azerbaijani rule.  Furthermore, the brutality of the operation in the eyes of a new Russian 
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parliament shifted its support in favor of Armenia.  The new parliamentary speaker, Boris 
Yeltsin, was beginning to view Azerbaijan as a threat to state security.120  
P. MEDIATION IS ATTEMPTED WHILE THE SOVIET UNION 
COLLAPSES 
Moscow’s control over the conflict in the South Caucasus grew weaker as the 
Soviet state began to crumble.  The failed August coup in Moscow was followed by 
withdrawal of Soviet military units from Nagorno-Karabakh that led to an increase in the 
level of violence.  Azerbaijan declared independence on 30 August followed by 
Karabakh’s announcement of secession from Azerbaijan on 2 September.  Armenia 
followed, declaring their independence on 23 September.  The Soviet Union was 
consumed by existential concerns, but that did not dissuade Russia from attempting to 
broker a deal.121  
With little authority left to the state of the Soviet Union following the coup 
attempt, the presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan attempted to mediate a settlement that 
would bring an end to the regional conflict.  On 22 September, Boris Yeltsin and 
Nursultan Nazarbayev sat down with representatives from Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Nagorno-Karabakh with the precondition that territorial integrity of the states would be 
maintained.  In this context, Armenia renounced its claims on Azerbaijan territory.  In 
this way the conflict was transformed in a superficially legal way to a dispute only 
between Azerbaijan and Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh.  Terms of the settlement 
began with a ceasefire and included restoring the governing structure in Karabakh that 
existed before 1989.  Future talks were to occur that would bring about a final political 
solution. Fighting persisted in Karabakh despite the agreement, but talks continued until 
mid-November.  On 4 November, Azerbaijan cut a critical gas pipeline to Armenia that 
crippled Yerevan, and on 20 November, an Armenian rocket shot down an Azerbaijani 
helicopter.  Twenty-two people were killed in the crash including the Deputy Prime 
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Minister and Interior Minister of Azerbaijan and Russian and Kazakhstani observers to 
the peace talks. The Russian-Kazakhstani peace initiative was abandoned.122    
Q. THE SOVIET UNION FALLS AND FULL SCALE WAR ERUPTS 
The fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991 led to a new, more devastating, 
phase of conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.  Soviet units were pulled out of the South 
Caucasus on the eve of the Soviet Union’s demise, leaving not only a power vacuum but 
also a large number of recently unemployed soldiers and an astounding amount of 
military hardware.  Moreover, what was once an intrastate conflict had instantly become 
international.  In so far as Soviet troops acted as a military buffer, and Moscow politics 
provided a diversion and hope for a negotiated settlement, their absence brought about 
unrestrained violence and full-scale war in no time at all.  Armenians, confined largely to 
Stepanakert, had their eyes set on Khojaly and the occupation of Karabakh’s only airport. 
The attack that began on the night of 25 February 1992, on the fourth anniversary of the 
Sumgait pogroms, bore witness to the most atrocious brutality of the war, with civilian 
casualty estimates as high as 1000.123 
R. DOMESTIC POLITICAL UNREST BEGINS IN BAKU 
Azerbaijan’s losses in Khojaly brought political turmoil to Baku that would last 
four long months, led to four changes of power, and significantly detract from its war 
efforts.  Angry demonstrators numbering over 80,000 called for President Ayaz 
Mutalibov’s ouster for the failings of the government in handling the Nagorno-Karabakh 
situation.124  Mutalibov stepped down on 5 March, replaced by parliament speaker 
Yaqub Mamedov, awaiting presidential elections in June.  In the months that followed, 
Azerbaijani domestic politics became closely linked with military power and events on 
the battlefield.125   
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S. IRANIAN CEASEFIRE COLLAPSES / ARMENIANS TAKE SHUSHA 
A cease-fire, brokered by Iran in mid-March, held for just over a week before 
Azerbaijan resumed targeting Stepanakert with artillery from Shusha on 29 March.  An 
Armenian assault on Shusha led to its eventual capture on 9 May, coinciding with a 
meeting in Tehran where President Levon Ter-Petrosyan of Armenia and Interim 
President Mamedov of Azerbaijan had just discussed the general principles for a peace 
agreement.  The international ridicule surrounding Tehran’s inability to broker a deal led 
Iran to resign as mediator.126  
Shusha was significant to Azerbaijan for several reasons, and its loss sparked a 
new round of political upheaval.  Not only was Shusha the last remaining Azerbaijani 
stronghold, due to its location on a high plateau, the terrain was strategic from a military 
perspective.  Shusha was also considered the “cradle of Azerbaijani culture,” and its loss 
invoked an emotional response in Azerbaijan.127  From 14 to 15 May, using the defeat in 
Shusha as a springboard, former communist party officials staged a coup that restored 
Ayaz Mutalibov to office.  Citing the results of an investigation that cleared Mutalibov of 
any wrongdoing in the Khojaly affair, they claimed that the position was rightfully his.  
Mutalibov subsequently canceled the presidential election that was to take place the 
following month.  The next day, a countercoup by the Azerbaijan’s nationalist opposition 
seized the parliament building with the support of armor and troops, again ousting 
Mutalibov.  Presidential elections took place on 7 June as scheduled where the Popular 
Front leader, Abulfaz Elchibey, was elected.128 
The political strife in Baku created a distraction that drew Azerbaijani military 
forces away from Karabakh and facilitated Armenia’s successful 17 May assault on 
Lachin.  Control of Lachin meant control of the mountain pass corridor connecting 
Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh.  By the end of the month Armenians had firm control of  
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the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh as well as a physical line of communication with 
Armenia.  Armenian territorial ambitions had been realized and the possibility of losing 
what it had gained seemed remote.129    
T. INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS HEIGHTEN 
The international involvement by Iran through mediation in March was just the 
beginning of third-party involvement in this ongoing conflict.  Public opinion in Turkey 
put substantial pressure on Turkey’s Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, to support 
Azerbaijan in the conflict.  Understanding the complexity of the problem, Demirel was 
able to maintain a balanced approach, but when Armenian forces attacked into 
Nakhichevan in May 1992 that balance changed.  Turkey promised aid to Nakhichevan 
and made a public statement that Armenia’s aggression would not be tolerated.  Russia 
responded that “third party intervention in the dispute could trigger a Third World War,” 
citing the Treaty of Collective Security in the Tashkent agreement that had been signed 
just days prior.130  
U. AZERBAIJAN LAUNCHES COUNTER-OFFENSIVE AS CSCE FORMS 
MINSK GROUP 
An Azerbaijani summer counter-offensive was launched following the election of 
Abulfaz Elchibey in June of 1992, catching Armenians by surprise.  By September of the 
same year Azerbaijan had captured Shaumian, Martakert, the eastern flank of Kelbajar, 
and the village of Srkhavend north of Stepanakert.  Half of the territory of Nagorno-
Karabakh was again under the control of Azerbaijan after a period of fighting that, 
curiously, saw Russian troops supporting both sides of battle.131 
As Azerbaijan was taking back territory, groundwork was being laid in Rome by 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to begin mediation in the 
dispute.  A multilateral conference convened between Belarus, Czechoslovakia, France, 
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Germany, Italy, Russia, Sweden, Turkey and the United States that became known as the 
Minsk Group.  The group’s name comes from the peace conference that was to have 
taken place in Minsk but due to irreconcilable differences never happened.  There were 
two leading factors that led to failed talks.  First, Azerbaijan refused to recognize 
Karabakh Armenians as a party to the dispute, insisting that the conflict was only 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia, with Armenia representing the interests of Karabakh.  
Second, Armenia insisted that the impending legal status of Karabakh should only be 
discussed after peace had been achieved.  Conversely, Azerbaijan refused to agree on the 
deployment of a peacekeeping force, believing it would undermine Azerbaijani 
sovereignty thereby prejudicing the final determination.  Aside from the fundamentally 
opposed positions of the parties, the mediators themselves were not prepared to make 
peace.  There was a general ignorance and ambivalence surrounding the peace process 
that plagued it from the very start.  Mediators were more interested in competing among 
themselves than seeking resolution between Armenia and Azerbaijan.132  
V. KARABAKH ARMENIANS RESTRUCTURE FORCES AND PUSH 
OUTSIDE OF KARABAKH 
Facing the immense military setbacks and the prospect of continued Azerbaijani 
advances, Robert Kocharyan took the lead of a new Karabakh State Defense Committee 
on 15 August 1992.  As the former head of the “Ideological Section” of a radical 
Armenian nationalist group known as Krunk, Kocharyan had become the leader of 
Nagorno-Karabakh and would go on to become the president of Armenia.133  The State 
Defense Committee, created in the spirit of the 1941 Stalinist committee by the same 
name, assumed total control of the state.  All military-aged males were conscripted into 
the Karabakh Army and all businesses in Karabakh were subordinated to the war effort.   
Serzh Sarkisyan, who later served as Armenian prime minister under Kocharyan and is 
currently the President of Armenia, took charge of logistics.134 
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Under the leadership of the State Defense Committee, Karabakh Armenians 
realized significant gains in the opening months of 1993.  At the end of March, Armenian 
forces again controlled the majority of Karabakh and won back control of the Lachin 
corridor.  This time, however, the Armenian advance did not stop with the conquest of 
Karabakh and control of Lachin.  Armenian forces advanced westward in early April, 
taking control of Kelbajar and opening another corridor between Armenia and Karabakh.  
This bold move set in motion a strategy that created a massive humanitarian crisis.  
Azerbaijan scrambled in an unsuccessful attempt to evacuate women and children from a 
city of 62,000 by helicopter.  While thousands of Kelbajar residents were fleeing on foot 
through the snow-covered mountains, Armenians opened a second front to the south on 4 
April to capture Fizuli and isolate southwest Azerbaijan from the rest of the republic.135   
Offensive operations outside of Karabakh deepened the divide between President 
Ter-Petrosyan, who favored a diplomatic settlement, and Defense Minister Vazgen 
Manukyan, who supported Karabakh in capitalizing on a military advantage.  Acting on 
his own initiative, beyond the limits briefed to Ter-Petrosyan, Manukyan damaged Ter-
Petrosyan’s credibility and further spoiled the opportunity for a diplomatic settlement.  
Ter-Petrosyan even sent requests to Kocharyan to stop the assault, to no avail.  These 
operations provided the international community the first convincing evidence that the 
Republic of Armenia had conducted offensive operations within Azerbaijan and outside 
of Karabakh. Further allegations arose that Russia’s Seventh Army also assisted in 
capturing Azerbaijani territory.136   
W. INTERNATIONAL OUTRAGE TO ARMENIAN AGGRESSION 
The aggressive strategy adopted by Karabakh forces, in taking territory outside of 
Karabakh, created an international uproar.  Statements by the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) and the United States expressed alarm and concern, calling for the end 
of hostilities and the return of territory to Azerbaijan.  On 3 April, Turkey completely 
closed its borders to Armenia and prevented any international aid to Armenia from 
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transiting its territory.  Days later, Ankara ordered troops to take up alert positions on the 
Armenian border and stated its willingness to use military force if necessary.  Armenia 
responded, with support from Moscow, by reinforcing its border to Turkey with Russian 
army units.   Meanwhile, Iran was disturbed that hostilities in Fizuli had moved so close 
to its borders.  President Rafsanjani voiced his concern on 12 April, calling on Armenia 
to stop killing innocent people and withdraw. On 30 April, the UNSC passed resolution 
822 calling for a ceasefire and withdraw from Kelbajar and other territory outside of 
Nagorno-Karabakh.137  
X. ANOTHER ATTEMPT AT PEACE AMID DOMESTIC TURMOIL IN 
AZERBAIJAN 
Another attempt at peace was brokered between Russia, Turkey and the United 
States in an agreement that conformed to resolution 822.  After slight modifications 
Azerbaijan and Armenia found agreement, and with a great deal of persuasion by Ter-
Petrosyan Karabakh accepted on 14 June.  Karabakh requested a delay in implementation 
of the agreement for a month, perhaps with some knowledge of political developments in 
Baku.  Ultimately, political discord in Azerbaijan rendered the agreement void.138 
In June 1993, Azerbaijan was again experiencing domestic political unrest.  
Earlier in the year, concerned about thinning public support, sluggish economy, 
prolonged conflict, and rampant corruption, President Elchibey believed that the greatest 
threat to his position lay in Colonel Surat Huseinov.  Huseinov was the most successful 
and charismatic military commander in the war and drew a substantial following in a 
number of towns surrounding Karabakh.  Additionally, Huseinov had suspicious 
connections to Moscow.139  Seizing on a military defeat, Elchibey relieved him of 
command in February and dismissed him from the Popular Front party.  Huseinov and his 
loyal troops subsequently took control of Ganja and its outlying villages and demanded 
that Elchibey step down.  On 19 June, when Huseinov’s troops began the march to Baku, 
Elchibey fled.  Heydar Aliyev, a popular communist leader and recently elected chairman 
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of the Supreme Soviet, assumed control of the government and brokered a power-sharing 
agreement in which Huseinov became prime minister and head of the military.  Three 
months later, on 24 September 1993, Azerbaijan joined the Russian led Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS).140  
Russia’s role in controlling what it considered its sphere of influence was 
prominent in Azerbaijan’s June regime change.  Elchibey’s alignment with Turkey 
against Russia, his pending agreement with Western oil companies that would launch 
exploration in the Caspian Sea and build pipelines through Turkey, Russia’s interest in 
basing troops in Azerbaijan, and the ongoing conflict wherein Russia was siding heavily 
with Armenia were all issues of Russian national interests.  Huseinov’s status in 
Azerbaijan and his connections to Moscow made him ideally suited to take power, but he 
lacked the political experience to become head of state.   Furthermore, Russia provided 
Huseinov the means by which to orchestrate a coup.  When Russia’s 104th airborne 
regiment pulled out of Ganja in late May, six months ahead of schedule, it passed nearly 
all of its weapons to Huseinov to equip his forces.  By mid-1993, Russia’s foreign policy 
focused on controlling its “near abroad” was strengthening.141   
Y. ARMENIANS ADVANCE CREATES GREATER HUMANITARIAN 
DISASTER 
Karabakh Armenians took advantage of Azerbaijan’s political chaos in June to 
launch a protracted but successful assault on Agdam, east of Karabakh.  Armenian 
momentum continued throughout the summer and into the fall as Armenians captured 
more territory outside of Karabakh.  By the end of August, Karabakh Armenians held 
Martakert, Fizuli, Jebrail, and Kubatly.  In late October, Armenians took Goradiz and 
Zangelan.  By December, Armenians controlled nearly 100 miles of Azerbaijan’s border 
with Iran.142  
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Conditions seemed favorable to strike a peace deal in late 1993, but the inertia of 
war made it virtually impossible.  Karabakh Armenians controlled nearly 20 percent of 
Azerbaijani territory that included two land routes to Armenia and a substantial buffer 
zone around Nagorno-Karabakh that place its population out of the range of artillery.  It 
appeared that Karabakh Armenians had a nearly ideal position from which to control 
peace talks, and Azerbaijan’s new president could politically withstand making a 
compromise by laying blame for lost territory on the previous regime.  Unfortunately, 
Ter-Petrosyan was in no position to broker a deal that he could not guarantee.  He had 
essentially lost control of Armenian forces that were caught in the momentum of their 
victories.143  
Aggressive Armenian expansion along the Iranian border raised international 
concern that a larger regional war could erupt.  As fighting continued in southern 
Azerbaijan, the geometry of the combat zone forced fleeing civilians into Iran.  In order 
to keep refugees from flooding over the border, Tehran sent troops into Azerbaijan to 
secure a safe zone for humanitarian relief.  This apparent violation of Azerbaijan 
sovereignty invited international scrutiny and raised security concerns by Turkey.  
Turkey responded by upping its troop strength along its Armenian border.  Russia issued 
a statement condemning the action and cautioned Iran that it had escalated and 
internationalized the conflict. As tensions rose, and the possibility for greater regional 
war was looming, the UNSC drafted another resolution.  On 14 October 1993, Resolution 
874 condemned the fighting and again called or a ceasefire, but also insisted that regional 
states refrain from action that would broaden the conflict.144   
Z. AZERBAIJAN TAKES A FINAL STAND 
In Azerbaijan, military losses compounded President Aliyev’s fragile political 
position.  On 11 December, Aliyev went on national television for several hours blaming 
military leaders by name for losses and condemning them for betraying their country. 
Aliyev was effectively weakening the political credibility of any military leader who 
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could pose a threat to the presidency.  His political maneuvering also significantly 
impeded the war effort.  He disbanded 33 battalions believed to be loyal to the Popular 
Front and replaced those 10,000 seasoned veterans with at least as many new young 
conscripts. 145  
The most brutal fighting of the war was seen at the very end, starting in December 
1993, as Azerbaijan began a new offensive.  Armenian troops pushing east out of Fizuli 
met with exceptional resistance from Azerbaijan forces.  As the Armenians pulled back, 
they were attacked on two more fronts.  Azerbaijan troops captured the rail junction in 
Goradiz, and a third attack much farther north took back terrain in Martakert.  In late 
December, Azerbaijani troops attacked near Agdam forcing Armenian forces out of 
strategically advantageous terrain overlooking the city.  With artillery in place that could 
range most of eastern Karabakh, Azeri forces made a push for the heart of Karabakh.  
Azeri units pushed into the Mardakert and Askeran districts on 9 January and moved 
within 11 miles of Stepanakert.  Simultaneously, Azeri forces took back the city of 
Goradiz and the 25 mile stretch of border along the Aras River while a separate unit 
temporarily controlled the Omar Pass, the northern corridor between Karabakh and 
Armenia.146  
Azerbaijani’s military successes began to fade in early February as soldiers weary 
from extensive offensive operations encountered heavy snowfalls.  Disorganized units of 
retreating soldiers became easy targets for the Armenians.  In late February, two entire 
Azerbaijani brigades were isolated while attempting to push through the Omar Pass in 
Kelbajar and lost as many as 1,500 troops to Armenian grad missiles.147  Desertion was 
such a problem among Azerbaijani troops that Aliyev ordered that all soldiers attempting 
to escape were to be shot.148  For such a high number of casualties, Azerbaijan’s winter 
offensive recaptured very little territory.149  
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AA. CEASEFIRE  
At the peak of hostilities in February, Representatives of the Minsk Group 
traveled repeatedly to the region in an attempt to broker a peace settlement.  Swedish 
chairman, Jan Eliasson, and Russian envoy, Vladimir Kazimirov, became the primary 
representatives in what became a highly competitive process.  Kazimirov won out, acting 
on behalf of Russia in a unilateral capacity, striking an agreement for a ceasefire with all 
sides.  On 4 May a delegation of representative from CIS countries as well as a 
representative from Nagorno-Karabakh met in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, to draft an 
agreement that called for a ceasefire and Russian peacekeeping forces to be deployed to 
Karabakh.  The ceasefire went into effect at midnight of 12 May and holds to this day.  
On 16 May, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev held a meeting with the military 
leaders of all three parties insisting that they each sign the ceasefire agreement that had 
already successfully been in place for four days.  Azerbaijan’s defense minister, General 
Mamedov refused to accept the plan for Russian peacekeepers but upheld Azerbaijan’s 
commitment to the ceasefire.150   
BB. SUCCESS OF RUSSIAN MEDIATION 
The primary reason that Russia emerged as the successful solitary mediator rests 
with interests and leverage.  Russia was interested in maintaining influence in its near 
abroad, which it believed it would accomplish by excluding western states from taking 
part in peace talks.  Russia wanted to base troops in Azerbaijan, which it believed could 
be accomplished through a peacekeeping force.  There was also a great deal of interest in 
Azerbaijani energy exports that perhaps Russia believed it could tap into if it maintained 
greater authority over Azerbaijan through military occupation.  Moscow emerged as the 
sole mediator principally because it controlled levers of influence that proved effective in 
bringing about a ceasefire.  Armenia was increasingly reliant on Russia for weapons and 
ammunition.  Just weeks before mediation began in earnest, President Ter-Petrosyan 
arranged a private audience with Russian President Boris Yeltsin to discuss a deal in 
which Armenia would receive the required weapons to restore Armenian forces to its full 
                                                 
150 de Waal, Black Garden, 237–40. 
 55 
operating strength.151  For Azerbaijan, the biggest concern was losing more territory if 
the fighting continued.  As talks began in 1994, Kazimirov warned Aliyev, “if you don’t 
allow Russian peace-keeping battalions between the Armenian and Azerbaijani forces, in 
a month’s time the Armenians will take Ganja, Terter, Barda, and the railway leading to 
Georgia.”152  This illumination of possible worst-case scenarios should be expected of 
any good mediator.  In the case of Russia, who could actively control the outcome by 
bolstering Armenian forces, this statement proved particularly coercive leverage.   
An element that must not be overlooked is timing.  There were many occasions 
over the course of the war when it seemed like conditions were favorable, yet the parties 
made no effort to meet.  There were instances when a deal was close but fell through 
before it was either signed or implemented.  Other times a ceasefire went into effect but 
did not hold.  Ultimately, it was exhaustion that led both sides to put down arms.  It was a 
condition of mutually hurting stalemate whereby each side felt it had more to gain by 
stopping than it would in continuing the fight that allowed a settlement to be reached.  
Russia’s leverage in the 1994 ceasefire was severely limited and directly related to timing 
and exhaustion.  Once the ceasefire was in effect, there was no more pressure that Russia 
could reasonably assert to bring about a final solution.  
CC. CONCLUSION 
Investigating the history of this conflict reveals several underlying themes that 
contribute to its intractability.  Foremost is the concept of identity and ethnic nationalism.  
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan believe that Karabakh is a critical part of their cultural past 
that must be preserved as part of their identity.  For many Azerbaijanis, who have been 
forced from their homes by the war, this is more than a historical piece of their identity.   
The Karabakh War hardened these prevailing beliefs among Armenians and Azerbaijanis.  
Both sides experienced devastating losses of resources, homes, countrymen, and family 
members that reinforced the sacred value imparted on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.  
The more that was invested in the war effort, the more each side was committed to 
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victory.  Over the course of the longstanding ceasefire, the conditions of exhaustion that 
precipitated a halt in fighting have long since faded, but the sense of loss incurred by both 
sides remains.  Neither is willing to forgo their nation’s sacrifices to compromise. 
Supporting nationalist sentiments is the belief by each nation that their claim to 
the territory is legitimate and that their actions are justified.  Each nation believes in their 
version of history that proves they are the rightful heirs to Karabakh.  Conflicting 
territorial claims, along with the predominantly Armenian demographic of Karabakh, 
have transformed into equally compelling arguments: one of territorial integrity by 
Azerbaijan and that of national self-determination by Karabakh Armenians.  While both 
sides present a persuasive case, this debate is not unique to Karabakh.  Moreover, 
international law is discordant on these principles.  While self-determination is 
considered a sine qua non for state legitimacy, the international community frowns on the 
forcible division of states.  The Charter of the United Nations upholds both principles in 
its first two articles.153 
Political elite and military leaders rose out of the conflict that supported, and in 
many ways perpetuated, the conflict.  Exploiting nationalist sentiments, rising leaders that 
had demonstrated their patriotism during the war were quickly elevated to higher offices.  
In order to remain in office, or compete with an incumbent, bellicose rhetoric and 
nationalist propaganda was required to keep the conflict in the political spotlight.  
Perpetual propaganda, in turn, reinforces nationalist sentiments thus creating a perpetual 
cycle. 
The conflict over Karabakh has involved varying levels of international 
involvement over its evolution.  Circumstances that faced Armenia and Azerbaijan from 
the October Revolution through the end of the civil war were those of large empires using 
small states as instruments in a contest of regional domination; each action that pitted 
territorial disputes against one another exacerbated the pain of integration.  Some 
historians saw Stalin’s decision to award Karabakh to Azerbaijan as part of a divide-and-
                                                 
153 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations. (San Francisco: United Nations, 1945), 3. 
 57 
rule strategy to ensure loyalty to the Soviet Union.154  Others saw the decision by the 
Caucasus Bureau as a method to appease Azerbaijan, whose cooperation as a Muslim 
dominated republic could entice other Muslim nations to join the communist 
revolution.155  However one interprets the decision to place an autonomous Karabakh 
within Azerbaijan, the fact that a narrow strip of land was established between Karabakh 
and Armenia demonstrates that a deliberate decision was made to separate these 
Armenian populations without any attempt to resolve the dispute. 
With the reemergence of the conflict during the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
conflict again developed an international component.  Russia assumed a prominent role 
in its post-Soviet sphere of influence, and the bordering states of Iran and Turkey became 
concerned for border security and refugee migrations.  Armenia’s continuous direct 
support to Karabakh, alleged Russian troop involvement in combat operations, border 
incursions by Iran into Azerbaijan, a blockade on Armenia by Turkey, and four UNSC 
resolutions put this conflict firmly on the international stage.  Mediators flooded to the 
region and began competing for influence in these newly independent states.  Regional 
and global powers were interested in the strategic placement of troops, denial of access to 
adversaries, international trade and investment opportunities, access to oil and gas, 
maintaining transit corridors, and arms sales.  Alliances and partnerships formed that 
eventually embedded the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in a larger regional 
competition for power and influence. 
Over the evolution of this dispute, elements of conflict have developed 
simultaneously at the levels of the individual elite, the nation, and the international 
system.  Factors on all three planes resonate harmonically with each other, creating a 
cumulative intractability with which modern day mediators must contend.  If any 
international mediator is to be effective in bringing about a final resolution to this 
conflict, they must acquire the proper leverage with which they can break the perpetual 
cycles of intractability that have developed throughout its history. 
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IV. CONFLICT AT THE LEVEL OF THE ELITE AND THE 
NATION 
The war over Nagorno-Karabakh and the resulting condition of no war and no 
peace has had a profound effect on both the Azerbaijani and Armenian populations and 
the ruling elite of both nations.  A ceasefire without final resolution has created a 
structure that has transformed the worldviews of both societies and altered the political 
landscape.  The national identity of each group has grown stronger in opposition to one 
another, and sacred values tied to territory have grown more intransigent.  Both nations 
continue to drift further away from those nascent democratic ideals that were inspired by 
their independence from the Soviet Union.  Regimes in both Armenia and Azerbaijan 
have grown more authoritarian over the last two decades as the governments have 
become mired in corruption, and political elites’ vying for power have exploited the 
ongoing conflict for personal gain.  At the same time that mediation has been bogged 
down by competition at the international level, the immobile framework of unresolved 
war has similarly hampered attempts at economic integration and informal diplomacy.   
Only through liberal democratic reform could both nations ultimately find compromise, 
yet these reforms are also thwarted by a number of factors surrounding the existing state 
of affairs. 
A. ETHNIC CONSOLIDATION 
One of the most immediate impacts of the war on society was the demographic 
change that took place in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.  Ethnic cleansing during the war 
was followed by a decade of outward migration from both countries after the end of 
hostilities.  Nearly one million people living in Armenia migrated to Russia, the United 
States, Ukraine, Belarus, or other Western European destinations between 1990 and 
2001.156  More than 600,000 minorities living in Azerbaijan fled during the conflict, 
while in 1993 the Azerbaijan State Statistical Department recorded a population of 
779,000 displaced persons from the Armenian occupation of the seven regions 
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surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh.157  The ethnic homogeneity created by this conflict has 
not changed in the decades since.  Armenia is currently 97.9 percent ethnically Armenian, 
and Azerbaijan is 90.6 percent ethnically Azeri.158  
The onset of renewed conflict in the 1980s also began the ongoing process of 
greater integration between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.  Presently, there is no law 
in Karabakh that identifies conditions for citizenship.  Citizens carry Armenian passports 
and do business with Armenian currency, the dram.  Armenian conscripts have served in 
Karabakh since the beginning of the war, the military command in Karabakh is under 
implicit control from the Armenian Ministry of Defense, and Armenia’s constitution, 
drafted in 2006, specifically emphasizes the unity of all Armenians.  Karabakh’s budget 
is heavily subsidized by Armenia, its tax law is synchronized with Armenia, and Yerevan 
pays the salaries of university professors and media workers in Karabakh.  Armenia and 
Karabakh share common telecommunication and transportation infrastructures and are 
legally bound by a May 1998 protocol on consultation and cooperation and a September 
2000 economic cooperation agreement.  Moreover, a significant part of the Armenian 
population envisions Nagorno-Karabakh will eventually be part of Armenia.  While there 
are some distinct differences between the populations of the Republic of Armenia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh, it is difficult to say that there is a separate political community.  It is 
inconsistent within this political discourse that there would ever be two Armenias.  
Independence for Karabakh is only a tactical step toward ultimate reunification with 
Armenia.159 
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B. THE SOCIAL BURDEN OF CONFLICT: ALTERING THE 
SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
The ethnic uniformity of each post-war state created conditions by which 
suffering associated with the war and ensuing status quo could be attributed not only to 
the other state but also the opposing ethnic nation.  Shared beliefs on both sides of the 
conflict are critical elements leading to intractability.  Political Psychologist Daniel Bar-
Tal asserts that to continue a conflict, society must share a belief that they have both 
human and material resources to endure and that time is in their favor. 160  Considering 
the economic and social costs associated with this frozen conflict, this is equally 
applicable to the standoff over Nagorno-Karabakh.  Each side must continue to believe 
that over time continuing the conflict will improve the eventual settlement or even lead to 
total victory. 
In order for a society to continue supporting the conflict it must adapt in the ways 
it meets its basic human needs.  Prolonged and intractable conflicts bring hardship in 
varying ways and intensities to the societies involved, from economic sacrifice to the loss 
of loved ones. Society must develop mechanisms to deal with the stress and hardships of 
austerity and the looming fear for their safety.  The psychological adaptations required to 
sustain an intractable conflict include development of strong solidarity and loyalty to 
one’s nation, desire to participate, and preparedness for personal sacrifice not to mention 
tenacity, bravery, and resolve.  Experiencing shared fear and hardship unites a society in 
a communal in-group, sharing a common identity and ideology that give meaning and 
understanding to the conflict.  The longer that conflict persists the stronger this societal 
bond grows and the more intractable the conflict becomes.161 
Societal beliefs that grow out of intractable conflict begin with the justness of the 
group’s goals.  As conditions get more challenging the justness of a group’s goals grow 
more resolute.  These goals may be existential in nature, but they also provide an 
explanation to the society about why they are fighting and suffering. Second, beliefs 
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about security emerge as a significant societal concern that influences virtually every 
decision the group makes.  National survival becomes the preeminent concern that 
subordinates every other domain of life.  Societies will develop beliefs that dehumanize 
and delegitimize the enemy and explain an opponent’s actions in a way that glorifies 
one’s own society.  Perpetuating beliefs that sustain the group’s positive self-image 
becomes increasingly important to society, with a tendency toward ethnocentrism.  
Frequently beliefs that the opponent has victimized the society arise, maintaining that the 
adversary inflicted the conflict.  Social beliefs about unity and patriotism grow as well as 
beliefs about peace.  Societies perpetuate a belief that their ultimate goal is peace, which 
provides solace and optimism that an end will come when their lives will be better. 
Because these beliefs are so critical to maintaining solidarity and continuing conflict, 
societies go to great lengths to impart them on their members to the extent that those who 
reject them are viewed as traitors.162 
These social beliefs and bonds that Bar-Tal refers to as the sociopsychological 
infrastructure are institutionalized through family interaction, public education, and mass 
media.  Children who grow out of a society in conflict, exposed to the same books, 
movies, television programs, and political conversation, become adults who take part in a 
public discourse based on the same world view. The beliefs that hold a society together 
through conflict constitute the ideology that also perpetuates violence and hinders 
resolution.  School curriculum, mass media, and internet news sources in both Armenia 
and Azerbaijan lionize their own glorified version of history and in so doing paint the 
other as an irreconcilable enemy.  Over the course of the two decades, this has eroded all 
trust between the people of these two nations.  Sona Dilanyan, a youth activist in 
Armenia, explains that even though the younger generation in both countries have not 
directly experienced the war, their viewpoints have been formatively influence by state 
propaganda and the negative images held by their respective societies.163 The strength of 
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these sacred values are illustrated in a quote from Arkady Gukasian, president of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, on 7 October 1997: “However badly the people live, there are holy 
things, there are positions that they will never surrender under any circumstances.”164 
The militarization of societies on both sides of the conflict is a result of the 
realistic possibility of war, but also perpetuates militaristic and nationalistic sentiments 
that prolong the conflict.  The patriotic public on both sides of the conflict view 
militarization and an arms buildup as a necessity to face the threat of another impending 
war.  Azerbaijan has to be prepared to take back its territory, and Armenia must be ready 
to defend what it has conquered.  Both sides see themselves as the most likely victor in 
another war, unconnected to any other political, social, or economic factor.  This 
allegiance has become so strong that expressing caution toward militarism in either 
country is offensive.  Many Armenians believe that the army, as the victor in the war, has 
earned the right to be trusted.  The prominent position in Azerbaijan is that too much 
oversight of the military will limit its capabilities to win back territory lost to Armenia.  
The large numbers of military volunteers that served during the war have filtered back 
into society as heroic veterans and have taken membership in organizations that educate 
the youth and pass along patriotic traditions.165   
C. THE RISE OF COMPETITIVE ETHNO-POLITICS 
The sociopsychological infrastructure in both Armenia and Azerbaijan developed 
in tandem with the political movements in these countries as they faced the prospect of 
independence from the Soviet Union.  Jack Levy describes the ensuing phenomenon as 
an “ethnic security dilemma” in an “emerging anarchy” and Michael Ignatieff calls it, 
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“the Hobbesian world of interethnic war.”166 As the Soviet Union began to crumble, 
Azerbaijan and Armenia were both faced with individual concerns for their own security.  
Without the structure of the Soviet Union that made interethnic accommodation possible, 
nationalist factions formed that cultivated fear.  Ignatieff explains, “People become 
‘nationalistic’ when they are afraid; when the only answer to the question ‘Who will 
protect me now?’ becomes ‘my own people.’”167 
With the fall of the Soviet Union, so fell the national discourse of each country.  
The communist ideology had crumbled along with the Soviet identity leaving nothing 
immediately in its place.  Political elites found themselves in positions to develop new 
discourses and strengthen national identities.  The discourses that developed, true to the 
form of emerging anarchy, helped the rising elite of each newly independent country 
legitimize their own rule.  By seizing on the popular concerns for ethnonational security, 
elites in both countries established authoritarian regimes that were resistant to opposition 
movements in the name of national security.  Ethnicity was politicized and became the 
main political identity, and as such Azerbaijanis and Armenians each saw the other as 
impediments to the realization of their own national identity.  The identities constructed 
on both sides of the conflict made it virtually impossible to sell the idea of compromise to 
a domestic audience.168 
The first political elections occurred in the shadow of the conflict and influenced 
the shape of democracy in both countries at its very inception.  Initially democratization 
led to strong nationalism.  Both countries experienced significant political participation 
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Russian influence in the region, and a 70-year history of communism made the Russian 
style of sovereign democracy the favored model of government by the elites of both 
countries.169 
The semi-authoritarianism established under Heydar Aliyev combined a 
pragmatic approach toward Russia with economic ties to western oil companies, but also 
cultivated patronage relationships with regional clans and brought elites from Aliyev’s 
inner circle to prominent positions in the government, making conditions ripe for 
corruption.170 A Soviet style cult of personality developed in Azerbaijan that is still 
prevalent today, with portraits, quotes, and statues of Heydar Aliyev plastered to 
billboards and walls throughout the country and abroad.171  Baku’s airport is named in 
his honor as well as a Cultural Center worth an estimated $250 million, and this year the 
first movie in a trilogy honoring the late leader is being released in Azerbaijan.172  Ilham 
Aliyev, Heydar’s son and presidential successor, has continued to perpetuate and 
capitalize on the cult of his father, gaining legitimacy of his own through billboards 
depicting the images of Heydar and Ilham together in consultative poses with the 
Azerbaijan flag as a backdrop.173 
Following the war, the political elites of Nagorno-Karabakh gained prominent 
status in Armenia and have risen to positions of power.  Robert Kocharyan, one of the 
principal leaders of the Karabakh movement, was elected president of Nagorno-Karabakh 
in 1994.  In 1997, then Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan appointed Kocharyan 
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prime minister to bolster public support.  Kocharyan rose in power and popularity and 
condemned Ter-Petrosyan for betraying the nation by entertaining concessions during 
mediation over Karabakh.  Kocharyan was elected president of Armenia when Ter-
Petrosyan was pressured to resign in February 1998 and was reelected in 2003 to serve 
out his second term until 2008.  Serzh Sargsyan, the chairman of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
Republic Self-Defense Forces committee during the war, was promoted to Armenian 
Minister of Defense in 1993, rose to Minister of National Security in 1999, was appointed 
Prime Minister in 2007, and was elected President of Armenia in April 2008 and re-
elected in 2013.  Additionally, Leonard Petrosyan, the second president of Nagorno-
Karabakh was serving as Armenian Deputy Prime Minister when he was killed in the 
1999 Armenian parliament shooting, and Slava Avanesyan, once secretary of Karabakh’s 
Security Council, later served as advisor to Armenia’s Prime Minister.174 
Political competition that has emerged among elites in both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan has given way to nationalist propaganda that rests on an underlying 
foundation of fear.  Internal struggle is characteristic of most ethnic conflicts as moderate 
leaders are challenged in their legitimacy by more radical frontrunners, and radical 
leaders compete for wealth and power.  As stakes change, so do the positions of 
politicians. The most effective way for a leader to arouse the attention of the masses 
during an interethnic conflict is to play the ethnic card and adopt an extreme nationalist 
position.  In this way political competition has become interwoven with populist 
attitudes.  Leaders of both countries continue to maintain their legitimacy in their ability 
to protect their state from certain annihilation at the hands of the other, and therefore rely 
in part on the continuation of conflict to support their campaign platforms.  The political 
competition that has developed in both countries contributes to the conflict’s 
intractability.175 
The extent to which leaders in both countries adhere to their domestic political 
positions on the conflict is evident in the lack of public involvement in the mediation 
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process.  Even though it is quite clear that any peaceful resolution to the conflict will 
require some degree of compromise, neither leader has made any attempt to prepare his 
people for this possibility.  While it is quite likely that a diplomatic settlement will 
involve Armenia relinquishing at least part of the territory of the seven occupied districts 
of Azerbaijan outside of Karabakh, politicians have begun to refer to them as “liberated 
lands” and proclaim that land liberated at the cost of Armenian lives will never be 
returned to Azerbaijan.176  Surveys and assessments of a cross section of both Armenian 
and Azerbaijani society concluded that at virtually every level in both countries the idea 
of any concession in negotiations was incomprehensible.177  This demonstrates the stark 
difference between the public pledges of the political elite and their nations’ actual 
negotiating positions.  When asked why the Armenian public had been isolated from 
public debate regarding mediation proceedings after what appeared to be significant 
progress in the Minsk Group sponsored 2001 Key West talks, Kocharyan responded, “I 
would not want to raise their expectations, without knowing for sure that the conflict will 
definitely be resolved.”178 
Staying in power is more important to each regime than reaching a peaceful 
resolution; therefore, maintaining a maximalist public position is a political imperative 
for the leaders of each country.  State propaganda directed to this end imparts domestic 
intransigence, but also hinders the peace process on a broader scale. Karabakh Armenians 
have unfettered access to Azerbaijani media in which they are regularly portrayed as the 
enemy.  It comes as no surprise in this context that few people living in Karabakh should 
feel compelled to reunite their territory with Azerbaijan. Nationalist rhetoric associated 
with political campaigns can also raise the aggressiveness on the frontlines and lead to 
increased border skirmishes.  There is a great danger that these incidents can spiral out of 
control and lead to a larger renewed conflict based on misperception and miscalculation.  
Bellicose rhetoric by the leader of one nation reinforces the fears of the other that in turn 
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contributes to the legitimacy of the opposing nation’s regime and the cycle continues.  
Peaceful resolution is not possible while these conditions persist, yet as the decades old 
status quo continues there are still other factors that contribute to the overall intractability 
of this conflict.179   
D. EFFECTS OF THE STATUS QUO 
The structure that has grown out of the present status quo strengthens the 
reinforcing loop archetype that has developed between fear and political competition in 
the growth of authoritarianism.  Rampant corruption fills the pockets of an untold number 
of elite political decision makers, the realistic threat of impending war reinforces the 
propaganda machine, and billions of dollars are spent on an arms race rather than social 
development or institution building.  Each side is given support and political credibility 
by large international players that reinforce the justness of each side’s position.  
Meanwhile, the longer the standoff continues the more committed each side becomes and 
the more feasible an indefinite status quo appears.  
The Armenian economy is overwhelmingly affected by 85 percent of its borders 
being closed.  Under economic isolation, many of the methods of survival that society 
learned under Soviet communism remain viable for subsistence.  The region surrounding 
Nagorno-Karabakh, particularly Agdam, was a black market hub in Soviet times.  The 
culture of corruption in the South Caucasus is not new, but has become more overt and 
bold under local independence.  The most blatant and notorious example is the exploits of 
Samvel Babayan.  During the war, while serving as Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Minister, 
Babayan established networks of corruption that drove a shadow economy and fueled the 
war effort.  His troops looted the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and sold their plunder 
to Azeris in Iran.  After the war, his racket continued in the form of a monopoly over 
trade in cigarettes and gasoline.  As veritable warlord, Babayan controlled not only the 
economy, but also nearly every other aspect of life in Nagorno-Karabakh from opening a  
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new business to getting a job as a schoolteacher. Even after being convicted and 
imprisoned for the attempted assassination of the president of Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Babayan was still upheld as a national hero.180  
Corruption is still rampant today with Armenia and Azerbaijan ranking 105 and 
139 respectively out of 176 countries on the 2012 Transparency International Corruption 
Perceptions Index.181  In Armenia corruption is still evident in politics as well known 
oligarchs occupy seats in parliament.182  While the majority of corruption in Azerbaijan 
revolves around extracting rents from the state owned oil and gas industry, it is probable 
that a large share of the growing defense spending finds its way to well positioned 
pockets of political elites.183  Moreover, the Aliyev family owns Azerbaijan’s largest 
telecommunications company, Azerfon, as well as numerous banks, gold mines and 
construction companies.184  According to award-winning investigative journalist, Khadija 
Ismayilova, the Aliyev family alone holds half of the nation’s wealth.185  The extent to 
which maintaining the status quo is influenced by personal gain among the political elite 
is difficult to quantify, but the means, the motive, the historical precedent, and the current 
level of statewide corruption suggest that this is indeed a factor in political calculations 
surrounding conflict resolution. 
Through the realist lens, amassing arms and fostering nationalist sentiments 
through propaganda is a critical element in preparing the nation for the possibility of 
renewed conflict.  It is critical to any war effort to cultivate a new generation of 
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nationalist patriots that will willingly fight to defend their nation.  In this regard, any 
attempt at fostering constructivist attitudes toward compromise in conflict resolution is 
not in the nation’s existential interests, and participation in dialog of this nature borders 
on treason.  Remaining postured for war is necessary, but that does not mean that either 
nation is willing to resume open warfare.   
Azerbaijan’s strategy toward Armenia is similar to the United States vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War.  Baku is attempting to crush the Armenian economy 
and social structure by forcing it to keep up in an arms race.186  President Ilham Aliyev’s 
comments indicate Azerbaijan’s commitment to this approach when he stated that his 
country will “continue to increase its military strength until the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict with Armenia is resolved.”187  Aliyev continues to build up his position of 
strategic deterrence by announcing that the country has purchased roughly 100 
helicopters as well as jet fighter aircraft and rocket systems and increased the military 
budget from $163 million in 2003 to its present level of $3.7 billion.188  That amount will 
undoubtedly continue to grow with the establishment of greater collaboration in the 
defense industry between Baku and Moscow after talks between Vladimir Putin and 
Aliyev in August 2013.  In contrast, Armenia has not been public with its defense 
procurement indicating that is both unable and unwilling to keep up with the notion of an 
arms race.  While there is no way for Armenia to keep up on its own, it has still shown 
signs of responding to the buildup.  In 2008, Armenia received $800 million in arms from 
Russia at a discounted rate and 2011 also saw purchases from Moldova.189 
Azerbaijan’s strategy of deterrence does not necessarily equate to a willingness to 
begin another war.  Azerbaijan is heavily dependent on western investment and revenue 
from European energy export via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that lies within 
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artillery range of the Armenian Army.  Even the crudest indirect attack by Armenia could 
cripple Azerbaijan’s exports and cause western companies to withdraw from the region.  
Therefore, very ironically, the more the west invests in Azerbaijan the more secure the 
status quo becomes.  The very aspect of the economy that has allowed Azerbaijan to 
establish a military advantage is also its most critical vulnerability.  Yet, the bellicose 
rhetoric must be maintained for the sake of political legitimization.  Azerbaijan will 
continue to placate the international community with gestures toward a peaceful 
settlement while simultaneously attempting to maintain a military deterrent against 
Armenia and making promises to the Azerbaijani people that it will take back its land 
under Armenian occupation. That is not to say a war is not possible, but it stands to 
reason that it would not be a calculated decision on the part of the Azerbaijani elite.  
There is still a risky balance that could be shifted by a strategic misperception by either 
side.190  
Continuing to run the propagandist war machine is critical to both nations if the 
conflict were to again turn to war, but creates problems if peaceful resolution is in their 
future.  The obstacles created by constant bellicose rhetoric may themselves be sufficient 
to prevent diplomatic reconciliation.  Moreover, money spent on an arms race is not 
money spent on societal reforms or institution building.  For a number of reasons that 
may include corruption and poor government policy in addition to funding the substantial 
defense budget, Azerbaijan only spent 0.03 percent of their 2010 annual budget on civil 
society development programs, which amounts to merely $3.8 million.191  In contrast, 
Hungary, with a budget four and one-half times larger, spends 1.01 percent on such 
programs, which amounts to $700 million annually.192 
Leaders of each nation have convinced their people that maintaining the status 
quo is an opportunity, but to realize the prospect of eventual victory both countries 
depend on international support.   Faced with the large economy and defense expenditure 
of their neighbors, Armenia sees freezing the conflict as an opportunity to wait out 
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Azerbaijan’s oil boom.  Azerbaijan is equally patient with its attempt to bring Armenia’s 
economy to its knees through blockades and an arms race.  While mediation has done 
little to resolve the conflict at the international level, the great powers that attempt to 
foster resolution on the international stage are enablers of the status quo at the national 
level.  Armenia is heavily dependent on its diaspora populations throughout the West and 
in Russia to support its economy and it relies on Iran and Russia for trade and energy.  
Political support from Armenians abroad also lends credibility to Armenia’s claim to 
national self-determination.  The international strategic bargaining that takes place with 
larger powers keeps Armenian elites in office who continue to support their entrenched 
positions.   
As Azerbaijani nationalism grows stronger, its need for international 
legitimization in mediation becomes increasingly critical to avoid another war.  It has 
resorted to some of the same strategies as Armenia in its national discourse.  The 
February 1992 massacres in Khojaly have been portrayed as genocide so as not to be 
outdone by the genocide claimed by Armenia.  Azerbaijan relies on international support 
in its claim of territorial integrity so has presented itself as an ally to the west in the war 
on terror.  Aliyev is forced to perform a continuous balancing act in appeasing the 
domestic demands for reuniting the homeland while not upsetting the status quo by which 
he maintains political control and economic stability.193 
Mediation keeps people on both sides content that something is being done and 
provides an outlet other than violence.  If mediation were to suddenly end, it is likely that 
strategic focus would shift exclusively to preparation for war, and getting all parties back 
to the discussion table would be made ever more difficult.  If 19 years of the status quo 
has proven anything, it is that nearly two decades of the current situation has been 
survivable.  To the young men and women of both nations entering their early adult lives, 
conscripting in the military and attempting to have a voice in the nascent civil societies of 
Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan, this is the only world they know.  It is no 
exaggeration to state that the longer this conflict continues, the more difficult it will be to 
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resolve and the more opportunity there will be for war to resume.  Liberal reforms in the 
realm of economic integration and informal diplomacy, discussed in the next sections, 
appear promising for long-term peace and regional stability, but they face significant 
challenges under the current structure.  
E. THE PROSPECT OF PEACE THROUGH ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Liberal theory of economic interdependence suggests that trade reduces 
conflict.194  Therefore, integrating the Armenian and Azerbaijani economies may result 
in building mutual economic interests that could prevent further war and facilitate 
cooperation in other areas.195  The maintenance of this conflict has imparted significant 
opportunity cost to all parties; so finding ways to curtail future loss would be a step 
toward reconciliation.  Armenia has lost out on lucrative investments in pipeline projects 
that could have brought in millions of dollars of oil and gas transit fees. 196  Azerbaijan, 
in the meantime, had to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to build transportation 
infrastructure that bypasses Armenia.197  Nagorno-Karabakh constituted approximately 
one third of Azerbaijan’s arable land prior to the conflict, and dammed or diverted rivers 
in Karabakh have led to water shortages in Azerbaijan.198  Additionally, the blockade on 
the Nakchivan Autonomous Republic has disrupted agricultural production and 
transportation to Azerbaijan, now possible only through Turkey and Iran.199  Estimates 
by the World Bank in 2001 indicated that lifting the economic blockade would lead to a 
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doubling of Armenia’s exports and raise its GDP by 30 percent.200  Azerbaijan’s exports 
would also be expected to increase by $100 million and raise its GDP by five percent.201 
The crux of the problem with integration lies in the realist understanding of 
relative economic gains and Azerbaijan’s aforementioned economic strategy toward 
Armenia.  Indicated in the figures above, both countries would gain in absolute economic 
terms, but Armenia has substantially more to gain than Azerbaijan.  From Armenia’s 
current economic state, virtually any cooperation would benefit Armenia more than 
Azerbaijan in relative terms.  An exhaustive 2012 research paper produced by The 
European Geopolitical Forum investigates the question of whether economic incentives 
could help break the stalemate in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, concluding that such 
inducements are only capable of playing a secondary role.202   
Benefits that would arise from economic cooperation could bring an end to the 
economic isolation of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, provide more direct routes for 
Azerbaijani energy, reduce the siege mentality of Karabakh, generate economic 
interdependencies, provide humanitarian relief to the seven occupied districts 
surrounding Karabakh, and change the zero-sum game into a mutually beneficial 
scenario.  Experts that are critical of economic incentives point out that economic 
benefits could not outweigh the security losses inherent in cooperation.  Anyone 
participating in such a program would fall outside of the accepted social norms 
surrounding the conflict and be labeled a traitor.  Many believe that Armenia has missed 
their opportunity since most of the lucrative projects have already been completed.  
Furthermore, it would upset the economic and political balance with Moscow if Russian 
gas sales to Armenia were displaced by less expensive energy from Azerbaijan.203 
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Based on surveys, Armenians and Azerbaijanis each had different interpretations 
of why economic cooperation would not provide an incentive toward ending the status 
quo, but both sides agreed that economic incentives alone would not be sufficient to bring 
about change.  Armenia would be unlikely to approve of any incentive that would detract 
from its overall security, and therefore economic cooperation could only take place once 
the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh was determined.204  Azerbaijan, controlling the 
levers of any potential economic engagement, would be unlikely to initiate any 
cooperative arrangement based on concern that it would appear as weakness on the part 
of Baku in conceding to aggression.205 
F. INFORMAL DIPLOMACY: ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL 
NETWORKING 
The constructivist role of informal diplomacy in resolving the conflict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh is important for long-term regional stability and a lasting peace 
between nations.  Some scholars, such as Philip Gameghelyan, believe that a 
constructivist approach must be the first step toward successful initial settlement.  
Gameghelyan, co-director of the Image Center for Conflict Transformation, believes that 
efforts toward conflict resolution has been excessively focused on state interests at the 
international level and too little has been done to address the identity needs of both sides 
that are at the root of mutual mistrust between societies.206  He asserts, “the Armenian-
Azerbaijani conflict is intractable not because its root causes cannot be resolved, but 
rather because they have hardly been understood or articulated, let alone addressed.”207  
If it is implemented successfully, a focus on socialization has the ability to change the 
perceptions of society to see the other side as people rather than the enemy.  It can 
provide understanding of the opposite side’s perspective on the conflict in a way that 
interests on both sides may eventually be met.  Through a broader view of the conflict, 
both sides can see that attempting to solve the conflict in a zero-sum framework stands no 
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chance of peaceful resolution.  Through intercultural dialogue, common ground can be 
established upon which there is agreement so that the process of reconciliation can begin.  
The fundamental goal of informal diplomacy is to establish trust between nations that 
interests of each side will be respected and that the terms of a settlement will be upheld. 
In this section, informal diplomacy refers to both track two and track three 
diplomatic initiatives.  The last two decades of international mediation of this dispute is 
an example of track one diplomacy, characterized by talks among high-level leaders that 
directly represent the interests of the state.  Track two diplomacy refers to a problem 
solving approach undertaken through interaction between influential non-governmental 
leaders such as NGOs or leaders of religious or academic institutions.  An initiative at the 
grassroots level to raise awareness and empower communities toward conflict resolution 
is referred to as track three diplomacy and may include meetings, media generating 
events, or other activities that provide a voice to a marginalized population.  This brief 
discussion of civil society engagement will encompass both track two and track three as 
well as the growing role of online social networking that in many ways bridges the gap 
between these two tracks.208  
Many promising initiatives are underway that promote dialogue between the two 
sides in a neutral forum of understanding. Among the most prominent are Global Voices 
Online, Model Caucasus Parliament, and the Image Center for Conflict Transformation.  
The latter publishes an online journal, Caucasus Edition: Journal of Conflict 
Transformation, as well as a blog, Neutral Zone: Blog of Caucasus Edition.209  The 
Imagine Center for Conflict Transformation also hosts offline events including an annual 
conference in Boston to bring people from both sides of the conflict together to openly 
discuss their differing perceptions of their history, the conflict, and the people of their 
countries.  These programs have a variety of sponsors in the United States and Europe.  
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Model Caucasus Parliament is sponsored by the Eurasia Partnership foundation that is 
funded by the United Nations, US Department of State, UK Department of International 
Development, UK Foreign Commonwealth Office, and several other non-profit and 
corporate sponsors.210  The Imagine Center is supported by the US embassies in Baku 
and Yerevan, the US Conflict Prevention Pool, and the Norwegian Atlantic 
Committee.211  Global Voices began as a project of the Berkman Center for Internet and 
Society at Harvard Law School and now enjoys the support of 20 other non-
governmental and corporate financiers.212 
While social media is a critical enabler for ongoing informal diplomacy, it is not 
been the panacea that some may have hoped for.  Under the conditions of closed borders 
and political pressure created by this frozen conflict, online social networking is the 
logical forum in which to carry the ongoing diplomatic dialogue.  With the Internet acting 
as the “great social equalizer,” conversations can exist online that would not otherwise 
occur, yet as much as it is a tool that facilitates understanding between the two sides it is 
also a forum for harsh propaganda and hatred.213  There are thousands of people taking 
part in “mini information wars with members taking sides, swearing at each other and 
humiliating each other.”214 One example of this online hatred occurred in November 
2010 when the NGO Caucasus Center for Peace-Making Initiatives attempted to organize 
an Azerbaijani film festival in Yerevan.  Facebook erupted in violent threats against the 
event organizers and spread to others who voiced support for the event.215  
While some peace advocates believe that an increase in online social networking 
will open the door to peace building at the grassroots level, others are more skeptical.  
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There are simply too few users on both sides engaged in dialogue and it has not 
developed a large enough base from which it can spread.  Furthermore, there are just as 
many social media users that support renewed conflict, and the governments of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan are also involved.  The political elites on both sides have established a 
network presence through real and ghost accounts that propagate their own opinions.  The 
governments recognized the threat posed by social networking and have taken measures 
to monitor online activity.  Azerbaijan has prosecuted online activists through a 
subterfuge of various other exaggerated charges, and new online defamation laws that 
went into place in June 2013 make it even easier for the government to incarcerate 
activists on criminal charges.216  
While NGO programs go to great lengths to create films and sponsor political 
dialog between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, they have had limited effectiveness over the 
last two decades.  One youth activist that has participated in such dialog programs sums 
up her experiences:   
The communication between two sides becomes possible only when they 
are willing to hear something that completely contradicts their point of 
view. The most important thing that I have learned is that understanding 
someone’s point of view does not necessarily mean agreeing with him or 
her. I would call this the number one principle for creating a possibility of 
cross-border dialogue. While addressing the disadvantages, I would say it 
is very difficult to go against the mainstream stereotypes of the society and 
have connections in Azerbaijan. For instance, my colleagues and I are 
often labeled as traitors.217  
Overcoming accepted societal norms of fear and hatred have been a significant 
obstacle for informal diplomacy.  Mainstream media is clearly tainted by nationalist 
propaganda, so it should come as no surprise that this would carry over into online social 
networks.218  Clearly, online social media is different than traditional media outlets in 
that there are some groups that discuss peaceful resolution, yet their peaceful virtual 
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presence has not made a profound difference in the opinion of the majority.  A November 
2011 Facebook poll asked users in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, “What is the most 
effective solution for the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict?”219  The results were astounding.  
More than 51 percent (Table 1) responded that war would be the most effective 
solution.220  Realizing that social media is more prevalent among the younger 
generations of both populations, there is a growing likelihood that the very idea of 
peaceful negotiation has grown stale in this group of future elites as so many show signs 
of distrust toward any talk of resolution other than war.221  
 
No. Options Responses Per. 
1 I do not care (apathetic) 71 5.17% 
2 War (Azerbaijan wins) 631 45.99% 
3 War (Armenia wins) 46 3.35% 
4 Status quo (existing state of affairs) 14 1.02% 
5 There are no effective solutions 48 3.50% 
6 Peace (win/win situation for both sides based on compromise) 477 34.77% 
7 Regional integration (establishment of political union in SC) 85 6.19% 
TOTAL: 1372 100.00% 
Table 1.   Facebook poll: “What is the most effective solution for the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict?”222 
In the last two decades, civil society has made no perceptible progress in moving 
the regimes of either country toward conflict resolution.  The obstacles and limitations 
imposed on informal diplomacy are indicative of each nation’s struggle in adopting 
liberal democracy.  The authoritarian nature of regimes on both sides of this conflict has 
prevented moderate positions from taking root.    
                                                 





G. THE ROLE OF DEMOCRACY 
A strong and independent civil society that demands transparency, challenges the 
government, and holds it accountable is essential for lasting peace between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan.  When liberal democracy falters and civil society is not allowed to develop, 
people cannot cultivate trust in their state’s leadership.  When people cannot trust their 
own government, developing trust in the government of the other side is made even more 
problematic.  Additionally, the regime must learn to trust the people for democratization 
to grow, and this cannot happen without a series of small steps toward building 
democratic institutions.  Without trust between people and between governments a 
peaceful solution based on compromise is impossible. Without a stable democratic peace 
the leaders of each country will not have the popular mandate required to agree to a 
settlement and will remain tied to the status quo in the interests of a few powerful elite. 
There cannot be trust that a peaceful resolution will be adhered to or that future corrupt 
elections will not lead to a resumption of violence.  Until maintaining political power is 
no longer contingent upon maintaining a culture of fear this conflict will remain 
intractable. 
Democracy has experienced a downward trend over the last decade in both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, according to their Freedom House “Nations in Transit” 
reports.223 The Freedom House scale ranks countries from 1 to 7 (with 1 being the most 
democratic) based on eight separate criteria including the electoral process, civil society, 
governance, judicial independence, and corruption.  Armenia’s overall score has slid 
from 5.00 in 2004 to as low as 5.43 in 2011 and currently sits at 5.36.224  Freedom House 
labels Armenia a “Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime.”225  Armenia has 
experienced a drop in all categories except corruption, which has seen an improvement 
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from 5.75 to 5.25 over the last decade.226  Azerbaijan is a “Consolidated-Authoritarian 
Regime” according to Freedom House, steadily falling from 5.63 in 2004 to its current 
score of 6.64.227  Azerbaijan has seen no improvement in any category, and its worst 
score is 7.00 on its electoral process.228  Notable among the lowest scores in each state is 
Independent Media.  Armenia moved up from 6.00 to 5.57 over the last year as it 
experienced a decline in the number of defamation suits, and media monitors determined 
that all parties leading up to the 2013 election had equal access to the media.229  
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan maintained its score of 6.75 as attacks on the media became 
violent and regulations on mass media and the internet were tightened.230 
Events in Azerbaijan in 2013 leading up to the presidential election in October 
have also demonstrated a democratic backslide.  On 10 April 2013, Baku closed down the 
Free Thought University, a school established in 2009 to promote democratic values.  
Several western backers of the project included the embassies of the United States and 
Great Britain as well as the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID). Since 28 April 2013, the government of Azerbaijan has selectively jammed 
satellite signals of particular programs including a program entitled Different News 
broadcast by Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) to the country of Azerbaijan. 
The FM radio broadcast of Azeri language news from RFE/RL was banned since 2009. 
Since 2009, RFE/RL journalists have been targets of “defamation campaigns; abductions 
and death threats; arbitrary detentions; physical attacks; and attempts to intimidate family 
members.”231 In a 2 July 2013 speech, President Aliyev tacitly encouraged police to use 
force against political opposition during the run-up to the next presidential election.  He 
reminded the audience of high-ranking police officers that following post-election 
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violence of 2005 no officers were punished and emphasized that no one from police 
forces will be disciplined for similar actions in upcoming protests.232 
The discussion of democratization and conflict resolution between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia can in one way be simplified to a philosophical debate over what comes first, 
the chicken or the egg.  Will democracy open the door to moderate positions that will 
eventually lead to cooperation, or is democratic reform sufficiently stifled by the conflict 
that waiting for each nation to change its internal politics is futile?  Is continuing a 
transition to liberal democracy a dangerous proposition amid an ongoing ethnic conflict? 
Furthermore, how should mediators approach democratic reform and what role should it 
play on the international stage?   
In a 1995 article entitled “Democratization and the Danger of War,” Edward 
Mansfield and Jack Snyder contrast the virtues of democratic peace theory with the risk 
of war associated with democratic transition.  The awareness adopted over the ages, that 
democracies do not fight wars against one another, is based on the notion that 
democracies have other ways of resolving their differences outside of interstate violence 
and is reinforced by a commonly held perception that democracies should not fight one 
another.233  Mansfield and Snyder are proponents of democratic peace theory, but offer 
caution for the cases of those states in transition from autocracy to democracy based on 
empirical data showing a significantly higher chance of war, specifically during the ten-
year period following this transition. Among the factors cited by Mansfield and Snyder 
that contribute to war are a weak and unstable central government, increased political 
competition that results in ethnonational political extremism, a growing inflexibility 
among elites who have not adapted to democracy, and an overshadowing of domestic 
interests by militarism and a state’s international endeavors.234 
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The conditions that outline the pitfalls of partial democratization describe the 
present situations in both Azerbaijan and Armenia with alarming accuracy.  The ongoing 
conflict has kept both nations in a tumultuous transitory state between full 
authoritarianism and democracy that has not been conducive to peace.  As Nina 
Caspersen points out, “the Karabakh peace process has suffered from the worst of two 
worlds: intense competition, especially in Armenia, but without the restraint and widened 
participation that democratization can provide.”235  In summing up the hazards associated 
with the period of democratic transition, Mansfield and Snyder conclude: “go fully 
democratic, or don’t go at all.” 236  There may be risks associated with democratization 
that must be managed, but ultimately a consolidated democracy is more stable than a 
consolidated autocracy.  In the case of striking a compromise for a settlement in this 
conflict, making political space for the emergence of moderate voices may be the only 
way to break the status quo. 
The international community has misunderstood the partial democracies of both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Political competition in both countries profoundly influences 
the masses but its focus is on the elite.  Political downfall of leaders in both countries has 
not come by way of the ballot box, but rather at the hands of elites and hardliners.  Elites 
incensed with military defeat or seeking greater power staged coups in Azerbaijan during 
the war.  In 1998, members of Ter-Petrosyan’s own party orchestrated his ouster without 
public discussion.  Still, the common perception in the international community, echoed 
by the Minsk Group, is that “the two presidents are ahead of their people” in attempting 
to find compromise that is not yet accepted domestically.237   
Mediators’ misunderstanding of domestic politics in Armenia and Azerbaijan has 
contributed to the problem of democratization. Statements echo through the media that 
particular years are ripe for mediation because there are no elections, while others stand 
no chance. Believing this, Minsk group mediators attempt to isolate the presidents from 
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domestic political pressure. Aliyev was able to convince Western embassies to put 
pressure on opposition groups following the fraudulent 2000 election, claiming that 
stability was required to go forward with mediation.238  Similarly in 2008, rather than 
condemning an undemocratic election, international mediators strengthened Sargsyan’s 
position following the controversial election in order to gain his favor in an expected 
compromise.239  The path of intractability has been paved by the good intentions on the 
part of mediators aimed at bolstering strong leadership rather than fostering institutional 
development.  The Minsk Group’s constant search for a quick fix rather than a long-term 
solution has left the conflict unresolved and neither country better off. 
H. CONCLUSION 
The ongoing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has created a setting in 
which political competition, focused on ethnic nationalism, has been woven into the 
fabric of the sociopsychological infrastructure of both nations.  Political and economic 
elites have manipulated the conditions of status quo to their benefit and created a system 
that reinforces itself through fear and corruption.  In this structure, the only people who 
have the power and influence to bring about a compromised diplomatic solution are those 
who benefit from maintaining the status quo.  Economic integration remains impossible, 
and informal diplomatic initiatives have gained little traction.  Meanwhile, international 
involvement by larger powers has reinforced the intractable structure at the national level 
by providing resources and legitimacy that leaders of both countries rely on to maintain 
their entrenched positions.   
International mediation has been ineffective because it cannot create conditions or 
provide incentives to the leaders of either nation that would make a settlement more 
attractive than the current status quo.  While a diplomatic settlement would bring long-
term stability and economic growth to both nations, neither leader is willing to jeopardize 
short-term security or their personal power and wealth.  Rather than focusing on 
immediate solutions that trying to fit a square peg into a round hole, international 
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mediators need to adopt a long-term outlook that rounds sharp edges and reshapes the 
problem.  A purely constructivist approach will never be sufficient to subdue the national 
or individual interests on either side, and an approach based purely on these interests will 
only result in continued intractability.  Due to the conditions on both sides of this 
conflict, compromise will only be possible through democratization.  International 
support for democratization is required and must be integrated into the mediation process.  
A course toward final resolution can only be charted once short-term incentives are tied 
to progress along a path toward democratization that will eventually lead to long-term 
stability. 
 86 





V. CONFLICT AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a contemporary dispute spawned from 
different nationalistic understandings of history that were constructed in the twentieth 
century.  According to Thomas de Waal, the conflict “makes sense only if we 
acknowledge that hundreds of thousands of Armenians and Azerbaijanis were driven to 
act by passionately held ideas about history, identity, and rights.”240  Nevertheless, this 
dispute does not exist in a vacuum.  These countries have borders, and among the states 
that border this dispute each nation has unique interests and its own designs to influence 
the geographically strategic South Caucasus.  The territorial dispute, amid a paucity of 
resources and relative lack of independence, led Armenia and Azerbaijan to seek 
alliances with larger more influential states with which they could pursue their 
geopolitical aspirations. The hostile context in which these alliances were formed ensured 
that patron states would be rivals as well.241  The role of national alliances in the conflict, 
particularly the greater regional powers of Turkey and Russia, have been seamlessly 
woven into the narratives that describe the history of this conflict in a way that portrays 
an air of anti-colonialism.242  While external state actors did not create this dispute, their 
various contributions and conflicting interests have created and maintained a polarized 
status quo at the international level that remains an insurmountable barrier to effective 
conflict resolution.  
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the framework for mediation in this 
conflict by explaining past efforts at mediation and describing different approaches 
toward resolution.  The four sections that follow explore the positions of the United 
States, Turkey, Iran, and Russia, how their influence contributes to the regional balance 
of power, and their role in conflict resolution.  A summary of cumulative barriers to 
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effective mediation is provided which leads into a conclusion discussing an approach to 
future mediation. 
A. MEDIATION: DOES THE APPROACH MATTER? 
The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) established the 
Minsk Group in 1992 to encourage conflict resolution over the Nagorno-Karabakh 
dispute following unsuccessful independent negotiation attempts by Russia, Kazakhstan, 
and Iran in 1991 and 1992.243  While it has not entirely supplanted bilateral diplomacy, 
particularly by Russia, the Minsk Group has been the single internationally recognized 
organization dealing with Nagorno-Karabakh mediation.244  The predominantly passive 
mediation by the OSCE has been ongoing for the last two decades without success.  Due 
to the confidential nature of the talks, it is difficult through the media to get an 
appreciation of any minor intangible gains; however, after this amount of time it is safe to 
say that 20 more years of the same would not result in anything substantially different.  
Mediation has failed for the simple, obvious, reason that virtually every possible 
combination of policy or concession that was thought up over the last 20 years has been 
less desirable than maintaining the status quo.245   
Thomas Ambrosio, while examining reconciliation efforts from the U.S. policy 
perspective, summarizes the problem of Minsk group mediations as its passive approach 
toward mediation.246  Ambrosio argues that a more active approach, even as a unilateral 
effort by the United States, would yield better results than what the OSCE has produced 
to date.247  Ambrosio criticizes the Minsk Group’s “passive diligence,” making 
proposals, encouraging debate, looking for common ground, and facilitating mutual 
understanding, as insufficient.248  This approach might have been effective if it was 
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pursued when the conflict was ripe for negotiation under an effective mutually hurting 
stalemate leading up to or immediately following the May 1994 cease-fire.249  However, 
in the months after the cease-fire, a new status quo rapidly normalized while the Minsk 
Group member nations, lacking solidarity, were unable to act.  By the time the Minsk 
Group partially reconciled its differences with Moscow, and incorporated Russia as a co-
chair, the momentum required for passive mediation was lost.250  After 20 years of 
unsuccessful mediation with passionately entrenched nationalistic factions, Ambrosio 
makes a credible argument for moving toward diplomacy that is more active.  He points 
out that while a substantially active commitment to resolution can be diplomatically and 
geopolitically costly, such an approach has proven successful in both the Dayton Accords 
and Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Accord.251  The April 2001 Key West talks arranged 
by the Bush administration was the most active of all Nagorno-Karabakh mediation to 
date and came the closest to reaching an overall settlement with both sides agreeing on a 
reported 80 to 90 percent of the issues.252   
While the argument for an active approach is compelling, a multi-faceted 
dilemma surfaces when regional states surrounding the conflict must weigh potential 
economic and geopolitical costs of implementing or cooperating with active diplomacy 
against their national interests in maintaining the status quo.  States contemplating active 
mediation must consider not only their ability to influence both Armenia and Azerbaijan 
but also the level of cooperation that they can garner from neighboring countries to 
prevent a shift in power to their disadvantage.  The current bipolar balance of power in 
the region, precisely aligned with the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, has not 
only prevented effective active diplomacy but also in many ways emboldens both sides to 
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maintain their inflexible positions on the Karabakh issue.253  While active diplomacy 
may one day prove itself as the key to resolving this dispute, it is unlikely that any 
diplomatic approach will be effective while the current balance of power remains the 
status quo.  The following pages examine the positions of the United States, Turkey, Iran, 
and Russia in this dispute, how their influence contributes to the regional balance of 
power, and their role in conflict resolution. 
B. UNITED STATES 
The United States’ policy toward the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, while self-
conflicting and inconsistent, has generally favored Azerbaijan’s claim of territorial 
integrity.  While alliances with the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
Israel align U.S. interests with those of Azerbaijan, the United States has attempted to 
maintain diplomatic ties with Armenia throughout the frozen conflict. 
The United States’ interest in Armenia is strongly influenced by domestic politics, 
particularly by Armenian-Americans who wish to see Armenia prosper as a 
democracy.254  The Armenian lobby was influential in pushing Section 907 of the 1992 
FREEDOM Support Act through Congress.  Section 907 excludes Azerbaijan from all 
governmental assistance aside from non-proliferation and disarmament until, as it states, 
“the President determines, and so reports to Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan 
is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive use of force 
against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.”255  Pressure from the Obama administration 
for Armenia and Turkey to sign the Zurich Protocols in October 2009, which would have 
opened borders and normalized Turkey-Armenian relations without regard to resolution 
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of Nagorno-Karabakh, was another reflection of U.S. policy presumably designed to 
appease the Armenian Diaspora.  This active U.S. diplomacy, attempting to unlink 
Turkish-Armenian relations from the Karabakh conflict, would have given Armenia 
political space with which to mediate without the pressure of economic blockade.  
Consequently, it also demonstrated the President’s desire to move the Armenian genocide 
issue off the foreign policy stage to be dealt with separately by historical commission, as 
called for in the protocol.  From a domestic perspective, this policy backfired when 
disapproval among the Armenian diaspora over concession on the Armenian genocide 
outweighed their concern for the economic benefit to Armenia, revealing the diaspora’s 
diverging interests from those of Yerevan.256  
Compared to relations with Armenia, the United States is more engaged with its 
interests in Azerbaijan.  These interests initially revolved around oil and gas development 
and export but have grown to address security and logistics challenges in support of 
military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terror at large.  
Azerbaijan has also been an instrumental partner to the United States in efforts to contain 
Russian and Iranian influence in the region. 
Azerbaijan oil and gas production has been a driving factor in U.S. relations.  As 
early as 1994, signs of American preferentialism in Azerbaijan began to appear.  Pressure 
from the U.S. government, refusing to allow U.S. ownership in the same oil consortium 
as Iran, convinced Azerbaijan to take back Iran’s five percent share in the Azerbaijan 
International Operating Company (AIOC) and sell it to Exxon.257  The United States has 
continued to support private investment in Azerbaijan oil and gas exports in order to 
diversify energy sources in the region and reduce Russia’s influence on the European 
energy market.258  In September 1997, Azerbaijan further embraced western involvement 
by signing a deal for construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline to be completed in 
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2004.259  Only three months later Azerbaijan helped the U.S. realize the purpose of their 
involvement in the AIOC consortium when Azerbaijan oil began flowing to the Georgia 
port of Supsa.260  U.S. engagement during the Clinton administration was aimed at 
ensuring Azerbaijani oil would make it to market without relying on transit through 
Russia, where it would add to the vast energy control Russia already had over Europe.261  
The route through Turkey was also advantageous to U.S. interest in rewarding Turkey for 
prolonged support during the Cold War.262  By circumventing Russia’s involvement in 
oil export, Baku and Ankara affirmed their ties to the west and further cemented the 
divide with Yerevan, Moscow, and Teheran.263   
Azerbaijani oil partnerships with U.S. involvement grew substantially in the years 
that followed.  Through a partnership formed in 2002, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)  
Company, an 11-member consortium led by BP along with U.S. firms Conoco-Phillips, 
Amerada Hess, and Chevron, agreed on terms of ownership and operation of the BTC 
pipeline for oil exports to Europe.264  In 2007, the United States granted Azerbaijan $1.7 
million to conduct a feasibility study on the prospect of a pipeline across the Caspian Sea 
in order to bring central Asian gas to the BTC pipeline and provide additional gas to 
Europe.265  As one of the fastest-growing economies in the world and an alternative 
energy exporter for Europe, Azerbaijan will remain an American economic partner for 
the foreseeable future.266 
Circumstances surrounding the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 changed 
the course of history for U.S. involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh mediation.  Amid more 
pressing international concerns, Washington did not follow-up on the progress made in 
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April 2001 in Key West.  Instead, drawing even closer to Baku as an ally in the Global 
War on Terror, the United States included in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 a statement that gave the president 
authority to waive Section 907 provisions, which the president has done every year since 
2002.267  The leading reason for this waiver has been to secure access to the Northern 
Distribution Network through which Azerbaijan allows over-flight, landing, and refueling 
of aircraft bound for Afghanistan as well as land transportation of military supplies in 
order to bypass Pakistan.268   
While the Obama administration has stated that resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict was a priority, larger global issues have continued to eclipse U.S. interest in the 
frozen conflict.  Higher priority has been given to a global war on terror, war and 
subsequent nation-building efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, concerns over Iran’s 
nuclear program, and a strategy to pivot to the Asian Pacific to deal with potential threats 
posed by North Korea and China.269  
At first glance, the United States appears more geopolitically suited for active 
diplomacy than its current participation as a Minsk Group co-chair would suggest.  
American interest is divided between domestic influence on one side and international 
economics and energy security on the other, making the United States the best candidate, 
among all interested parties, to be an honest broker.  Additionally, political capital 
expended by the United States is unlikely to significantly change the regional balance of 
power.  Unfortunately, as neither a weapons supplier nor substantial contributor to the 
wealth of either country, the United States has little leverage in actively resolving the 
conflict, particularly if, or when, it becomes kinetic.270  Considering America’s financial 
crisis and extensive military commitments, it is not surprising that Congress is divided on  
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the issue of involvement in the South Caucasus.  While some representatives see the 
opportunity for prosperity in this strategic trade and security corridor, others are weary of 
U.S. involvement in the region’s political and ethnic problems.271 
C. TURKEY 
As a powerful geopolitical influence in the region, rival to Russia and Iran and 
ally to Azerbaijan, Turkey has proven its ability to hold resolution in abeyance.  Turkey 
took advantage of the relative power vacuum immediately following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union to gain a foothold in the South Caucasus by way of Azerbaijan.  This 
alliance, ostensibly to reunite Turkic brethren, was an attempt by Turkey to redefine itself 
in the eyes of the west as a contender in global politics and a bridge to Central Asia.272  
Turkey was also determined to become a stakeholder in what would become a growing 
energy market.273  Azerbaijan saw Turkey not only as a historical and linguistic brother, 
but also as a model of a secular, free-market democracy with strong ties to the west.274  
Russia considered Turkey an interloper into its sphere of influence that must be 
contained, while Iran regarded Turkey’s expanding influence as an extension of U.S. 
policy in the region.275  Even though Turkey echoed Azerbaijan’s sentiments of “One 
nation two states,” its apprehension toward Russia and its fear of becoming embroiled in 
another situation similar to Cyprus limited Ankara’s level of support for Azerbaijan.276  
The geopolitical tension created by Turkey’s eastward expansion laid the foundation for 
the nascent bipolar alliances that would share a common focal point in the Nagorno-
Karabakh dispute. 
Armenia’s relationship with Turkey is encumbered by Ankara’s staunchly pro-
Azerbaijan position on the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, Turkey’s refusal to acknowledge 
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the Armenian genocide of 1915-1916, and Armenia’s infeasible claim to its historical 
territory in eastern Turkey.  While Armenian attempts at rapprochement with Turkey 
began under the leadership of Armenian’s first president, Levon Ter-Petroysan, in 1990, 
all attempts at normalization have been unsuccessful thus far. Relations broke down 
further in 1993 when Turkey closed its border to Armenia in support of Azerbaijan 
during the ongoing battle over Nagorno-Karabakh.   
The closest that Turkey and Armenia have come to normalization in the last 20 
years occurred in Zurich on 10 October 2009, when foreign ministers from both countries 
signed two protocols that together called for nothing short of completely open relations 
across borders.  Together these protocols called for establishing embassies in both 
countries, opening their common border and agree to “implement a dialogue on the 
historical dimension … including an impartial scientific examination of the historical 
records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations.”277  
As simple as this declaration appeared on the surface, there was a major hurdle that each 
country had to overcome.  For Armenia, agreeing to these protocols would take 
discussion of genocide off the political table and move it to the annals of history.  For 
Turkey, signing the protocols without a precondition for resolution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh dispute would mean retracting the support it had extended to Azerbaijan by 
closing its borders originally.  Turkey’s rapprochement with Armenia is a zero-sum game 
as far as Azerbaijan is concerned.  Progress made with Armenia is credibility lost with 
Azerbaijan.278  The Armenian government’s public interpretation of the protocols refused 
to abandon Armenia’s official policy on genocide recognition.  While that did not stop 
them from agreeing to the text of the protocol, Armenia’s interpretation no longer met the 
criteria of a concession for Turkey.279  Simultaneously, threats from Azerbaijan to cut off 
gas shipment to Turkey and increase political pressure from the Azerbaijani lobby in 
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Turkey led to post-protocol conditions on Nagorno-Karabakh by Turkey.280  The 
protocols have yet to be ratified by either country, and discussion has been suspended by 
the Armenian parliament indefinitely.281 
Considering that the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh was the very reason that 
Turkey closed its border to Armenia, a breakthrough in Turkey-Armenia relations 
through the 2009 protocols would have been a huge step toward resolving the conflict.  
Mediators saw an end to Armenian isolation as a way to reduce Baku’s advantage over 
Yerevan since “its closest ally had in effect made a separate peace with its enemy.”282  
Armenian critics of Turkey’s abstention argue that by placing new conditions on the 
protocols, Turkey removed any further pressure to open its borders while, at the same 
time, interjecting itself as an active negotiator while protecting Azerbaijan’s interests.283  
In August 2010, to repair relations associated with failed Turkey-Armenian protocols, 
Turkey and Azerbaijan agreed on a 10-year strategic partnership and mutual assistance 
agreement, specifying that any attack by a third country would be reciprocated by the 
other.284   
Economic relations between countries in the region have played a role in 
regulating potential escalation of the conflict, and increased economic interaction may 
eventually inspire more productive mediation.  In this regard, Turkey stands out for its 
firm solidarity with Azerbaijan that totally excludes any official interaction with 
Armenia.  Pipelines have been constructed that bypass Armenia while tying even more 
closely the economies of Azerbaijan and Turkey, and the prospective Trans-Anatolian 
Pipeline to begin construction in 2015 will further reinforce this linkage.285  Limited 
trade between Turkey and Armenia does occur, to the order of approximately $200 
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million annually and growing, but must be accomplished via Georgia, usually involving 
separate invoices to superficially disguise the country of origin.286  In contrast, both Iran 
and Russia, while firmly backing Armenia, have had open relations with Azerbaijan.  
Turkey’s strong economic relationship with Russia and its aspirations of integration into 
the European Union have contributed to Ankara’s restraint from greater direct 
involvement in the conflict.287 
Turkey’s foreign policy and role in the conflict have changed over the span of this 
dispute from Kemalist conservatism in the 1990s to being a much more involved and 
activist influence on the region today.288  If frozen conflict reignites to active conflict, 
Turkey is going to have a significant role to play.  According to E. Wayne Merry, Senior 
Fellow for Europe and Eurasia at the American Foreign Policy Council, Turkey has a 
“patron-client relationship with Azerbaijan, in which … it’s all too apparent that the 
problem of the tail wagging the dog is a danger for Ankara’s policy and interests.”289  As 
Turkey becomes more reliant on Azeri gas there is potential for substantial change.  On 
the one hand, Turkey might be more inclined to seek greater stability in the region.290  
Conversely, it may become more disposed to support Azerbaijan, its primary source of 
energy.   
D. IRAN 
Iran’s position in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is based more on regional power 
and containment of western influence than unconditional support of either party to the 
conflict.  The Islamic Republic of Iran maintains a relationship of convenience in support  
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of Christian Armenia while not isolating Azerbaijan completely.  With two of its four 
borders closed, Armenia receives critical resources from Iran in exchange for maintaining 
a roadblock to western hegemony.   
Like Turkey, Iran sought to take advantage of the period of relative Russian 
isolationism in the early 1990s by establishing itself as a route for energy resources 
leaving the Caucasus, but it has had to tread lightly to avoid confrontation with Russia, 
upon which Iran depends for military hardware and technology.  Iran’s long-standing 
hostility toward the west manifests itself toward Turkey’s policy in attempting to 
establish dominance in the region.  Iran feared Turkey would act by proxy for western 
powers, bringing unwanted western influence into the region.  By siding with Armenia, 
Iran could thwart Turkey’s plans for eastern expansion and gain greater access with 
which to influence the Muslim Republics of Central Asia.  While the majority of 
Azerbaijan is Shi’a Islam, making it an ideal target for Iranian influence, Soviet-era 
historical revisionism created Azeri nationalist sentiments of irredentism toward Iranian 
Azerbaijan.  Iran fears that cross-border influence from Azerbaijan may sow the seeds of 
separatism among northern Iranians and create a threat to territorial integrity.  As recently 
as March 2013 there were groups that met publically in Azerbaijan, calling for 
independence for Iran’s Azeri minority.  One participant was quoted in the media stating, 
“If the Iranian government loses control, the National Movement is ready to take control 
of Southern Azerbaijan.”291  Additionally, Azerbaijan’s increasing secularism hinders 
closer ties with the Islamic Republic.292 
Armenian’s friendly relationship with Iran have brought opportunities for trade 
and diversity of energy resources while limiting Turkey’s influence in the region and 
balancing against the Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance.293  As of 2011, Armenia received as 
much as 14.1 billion cubic feet of gas from Iran, and plans to expand this import may 
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lead to energy independence from Russian gas transported through Georgia.294  Current 
trade between Iran and Armenia is approximately $500 million, but strengthening 
relations make Tehran hopeful that this amount will grow substantially, even doubling, in 
the near future.295  In a joint statement in December 2011, Iran and Armenia agreed to 
bring more vigor to their cooperation on technology and research to focus on joint energy 
projects that will stimulate increased trade.296  Construction began in late 2012 on an 
Iranian financed joint hydroelectric power plant along the Aras River near Meghri, 
Armenia, and talks are progressing well on plans to build a pipeline and railway 
connecting Armenia to Iran and other Persian Gulf countries.297 
Unlike Turkey’s relationship with Armenia, Iran has not allowed political tension 
to completely supersede its economic interests with Azerbaijan.  A long shared border, 
potential trade routes via the Persian Gulf, and access to the Nakhichevan exclave by way 
of Iran make normalized relations desirable for Azerbaijan.298  A lack of mutual trust and 
the substantial western influence on Azerbaijan have prevented an enduring economic 
partnership from developing.  Iran’s hopes for transporting Azerbaijani oil to Persian 
Gulf ports were dashed with the establishment of the BTC pipeline that not only 
redirected oil to Europe but also bypassed Iran entirely.299  Limited cooperation between 
Azerbaijan and Iran continues on a year-by-year basis only out of necessity.300  
Azerbaijan trades with Iran in gas in exchange for gas exports to the Nakhichevan 
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exclave.  Exports of Azerbaijani gas to Iran have grown from seven billion cubic feet in 
2005 to 17.7 billion cubic feet in an agreement signed in 2009.301 
Israel, a U.S. ally and enemy of Iran, has established a strong partnership with 
Azerbaijan.  Israel receives one-third of its oil from Azerbaijan through the BTC pipeline 
by way of ship from Turkey to Israel.302  A continuing upward trend in Azeri exports to 
Israel peaked in 2008 at an estimated $3.6 billon.303  Israelis are increasing their foreign 
investments in Azerbaijan as exemplified by joint ventures in a variety of areas, from 
mobile-telephone service to drone manufacturing, while an Azerbaijan oil company is 
currently exploring in Israeli waters south of Ashkelon.304  Even more profound than 
mutual commercial interests is Israel’s contribution to Azerbaijan’s defense.  Early in 
2012, Azerbaijan arranged its largest weapons purchase to date, agreeing to buy $1.6 
billion in weapons from Israel, an amount almost equal to its $1.7 billion defense 
budget.305  Statements from Israeli defense officials assert that these weapons are not 
intended to threaten Iran, but rather Armenia.306  Nonetheless, these developments have 
potential to further align Armenian and Iranian interests, create a deeper divide in this 
conflict, and embolden Azerbaijan toward military action.   
Iran’s observation of Azerbaijan’s military buildup has contributed to its growing 
perception of offensive collusion between Azerbaijan, Israel, and the United States.  
Increased U.S. presence in Azerbaijan as part of the Northern Distribution Network along 
with increasingly warm relations between Azerbaijan and Israel significantly raise 
anxiety for Iran amid the standoff against Israel and the United States over its nuclear 
program.  In October 2012, 22 Azerbaijanis with links to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard 
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were convicted of planning terrorist attacks against the U.S. and Israeli embassies in 
Baku and given sentences between 10 and 15 years.307  Iranian security services alleged 
that Azerbaijan has assisted Israel in perpetrating cyber attacks and assassinations as well 
as planning for future military operations targeting Iran’s nuclear research program.308  
These fears have led to counter-espionage offensives focused on Iran’s ethnic Azeri 
population.309  Tehran’s greatest fear is that Israel could use Azerbaijan for staging or 
refueling in an attack on Iranian nuclear research facilities.310  While officials of Israel 
and Azerbaijan deny such possibility, former Azeri military officers and Russian 
intelligence sources have admitted to the media that planning for such an attack has 
included the possible use of Azeri bases and intelligence services.311 
Iran shares a common ambition with Russia to minimize western influence in the 
region, but Iran’s desire to contain Russian power prevents effective cooperation toward 
resolving the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.312  Increasing regional stability 
would aid Iran in preserving territorial integrity and improving trade, but taking 
Azerbaijan’s military focus away from Armenia may not be in Iran’s best interest.  Iran 
has offered itself as mediator to the conflict on multiple occasions, presumably to gain 
greater influence in the region and improve its international credibility.  Karabakh-
Armenians favor Iranian mediation because Iran has previously invited leadership of the 
disputed territory to the table, but Azerbaijani leadership strongly rejects Iran as an 
acceptable mediator.313  According to Wayne Merry, a former American diplomat, and  
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senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council, Iran’s “poisonous relationship 
with Baku essentially rules it out as a positive contributor either to conflict avoidance or 
conflict resolution.”314 
E. RUSSIA 
Russia’s approach to the states of the Former Soviet Union after its collapse, and 
its redefined role in the region, is explained in the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept of the 
Russian Federation.  In this document, Russia describes its role akin to a self-appointed 
protector of peace in its reclaimed sphere of influence. The doctrine states that Russia has 
a “responsibility to our peoples and to the world community for ensuring stability and 
human rights and freedoms in the space of the former USSR.”315  It also asserts that, 
“Russia will actively oppose any attempts to increase the military-political presence of 
third states in the countries contiguous with Russia.”316  This doctrine was written in 
sufficiently broad terms that Moscow could justify virtually any intervention in what it 
believed was its sphere of influence.  Furthermore, it considered the growing influences 
of Turkey and Iran in the region as threats to Russian security.  Given that its vulnerable 
southern border in the Caucasus also served as a strategic land bridge to Europe, Central 
Asia, and the Middle East, Russia saw overlapping geostrategic reasons for maintaining 
an influential presence at the expense of any other nation.  With ongoing instability in the 
Northern Caucasus and possible escalation of Islamic extremism, Moscow was 
determined to maintain influence and control in the states of the Southern Caucasus.317  
Russia’s inward focus on domestic issues immediately following the fall of the 
Soviet Union created a void in the south Caucasus that was quickly filled by other 
influential nations, a consequence that Russia has subsequently attempted to reverse.  
Russia has developed a strong rapport with Armenia, siding with Yerevan in the dispute 
over Karabakh.  While their relationship is mutualistic, it has created a substantial 
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Armenian dependence on Russia both economically and militarily.  Russia relies on 
Armenia as its only ally in the region, and aside from Iran, Armenia has no other large 
power with which to align.  Russia has taken advantage of this arrangement largely 
through swapping Armenian property for debt owed to Russia, for which some estimates 
claim Russia now controls up to 70 percent of the Armenian economy.318  Meanwhile, 
Moscow has forgiven the debts of many other countries that are less strategically 
important to Russia, indicating that this dependency is by Russian design.  Among the 
Armenian assets now belonging to Russia, a large percentage of factories lay dormant as 
their Russian owners realize that in Armenia’s economy these plants will not be as 
productive as their domestic counterparts are.  The combination of Russian and Armenian 
policies exacerbates Armenian isolation.  Not only are Armenian borders blocked by 
Turkey and Azerbaijan, but Russia’s conflict with Georgia has complicated trade with 
Russia via Armenia’s northern border.319  
Armenia depends on Russia for military and political support amid threats posed 
by Azerbaijan and Turkey.  Moscow and Yerevan signed an agreement in August 2010 
that extends Russia’s military basing rights in Armenia to 2044 and pledges to safeguard 
Armenian national security, upgrading its presence there to one of virtual protectorate as 
it continues to supply modern weapons and support Armenian Army units.320  Russian 
troops in Armenia are estimated to number over 3,000, with predominantly Russian 
troops guarding the Turkey and Iran borders.321 
While Armenia is strongly linked to Russia both militarily and economically, 
Russia has not abandoned its relationship with Azerbaijan.  Although Azerbaijan treats 
Russia with a high degree of skepticism, aggrieved by its treatment under Soviet Rule 
and suspicious of Moscow’s objectives, it still cooperates with Russia when it is in its 
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own interest.322  Russia has very limited political power over Azerbaijan.  Resolution of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in favor of Azerbaijan is practically the only concession 
that would provide substantial leverage, but that would permanently upset the current 
balance of power.323  Instead, Russia has relied on minor dispensations such as material 
privileges, territorial concessions, and weapons sales to sustain their bilateral relations.324 
Azerbaijan’s view of Russia has changed since it initially received independence, 
becoming more pragmatic as politics changed in the region.  Following the breakup of 
the Soviet Union, and under the leadership of the Azerbaijan Popular Front, Azerbaijan 
saw their oil and gas resources as a potential political lever in which they could push 
Russian influence out of the region.  Azerbaijan blamed Russia for the conflict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh, and by signing lucrative contracts with western companies they 
believed they could establish a pro-Azerbaijan lobby in the west to counter the influence 
of the large Armenian diaspora.  Beginning in 1994 under the leadership of Heydar 
Aliyev, Azerbaijan adopted a more businesslike relationship with Russia, allowing 
Russian owned LUKoil a 10 percent share in its oil consortium.  Perhaps unwittingly, this 
contract crated internal conflicting interests in Russia between the Russian Ministry of 
Energy and the Military and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.325   
Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia are not out of shared interests as much as 
necessity.  Azerbaijan’s domestic policy falls short of the expectations of the European 
Union and therefore it must rely on Russia’s role as a mediator in the conflict.326  For this 
reason alone, it must tread carefully in dealing with Moscow.  Despite Russia’s alliance 
with Armenia, Azerbaijan believes that maintaining a cordial relationship with Russia 
will give it political and economic leverage.327 Russia’s control of the Volga-Don Canal, 
for instance, is critically important to Azeri trade via the Caspian Sea to global trade 
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routes.328  Moscow has taken advantage of its relationship with Azerbaijan to reap 
economic rewards on both sides of the Karabakh conflict, becoming an arms dealer to 
both countries.  Between 2007 and 2011, it provided 55 percent of Azerbaijan’s and 96 
percent of Armenia’s arms imports.329 
From the beginning, Russia’s interest in mediating has been motivated by its 
desire for regional domination, focused on national interests at the expense of peace.  
Moscow’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict began under Mikhail Gorbachev in 
1988, well before the conflict erupted into open warfare.  Gorbachev’s misunderstanding 
of the situation, and belief that the Karabakh-Armenian nationalist movement could be 
put down by force, gave rise to the last civil war of the Soviet Union in 1991.  The fall of 
the Soviet Union led to full-scale war over Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia’s entrance on the 
scene as mediator, and the formation of the CSCE Minks Group.  Despite the fact that 
Russia was a member of the Minks Group, mediation from early 1992 through December 
1994 saw Russia and the CSCE at odds over domination of the peace talks, effectively 
stalling any progress toward final resolution.  This was in large part due to Russia’s view 
that U.S. involvement in mediation was a pretense to encroach on Russia’s sphere of 
influence as indicated in its foreign policy published the year prior: 
In cooperation with the United States on international problems, the 
conflict situations along the perimeter of the Russian borders will, most 
likely, come to the forefront.  We cannot exclude efforts by the United 
States, under the guise of mediation and peacemaking efforts, to take 
Russia’s place in the countries of its traditional influence.330 
Russia’s goal of putting its own peacekeeping troops on the ground in both 
countries, as a bid for greater regional influence, was adopted by Armenia but 
vehemently rejected by Azerbaijan.  Just four months after the cease-fire, on 20 
September 1994, the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic signed an $8 billion 
contract with companies from the United States, United Kingdom, Norway, Turkey, 
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Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Japan.  Azerbaijan saw the so-called “Contract of the Century” 
as an opportunity to gain greater independence from Russia and therefore supported an 
alternate plan presented by the CSCE to implement multinational peacekeeping troops 
once a peace agreement was signed. Azerbaijan blamed Russia for an attempted coup to 
overthrow President Heydar Aliyev that followed the signing of the oil contract, 
furthering Baku’s resolve to support mediations by the Minks Group and abolishing 
Moscow’s chance at being the sole mediator.  In exchange for concession on the future 
use of a multinational peacekeeping force, Russia became a co-chair on the Minsk Group 
in December 1994.331 
Russia’s early missteps and subsequent alliances have damage Moscow’s 
standing as a reliable mediator.  The “ripeness” of the environment for negotiations was 
allowed to spoil as time passed after the initial cease-fire.332  During talks in Moscow 
that followed the 1994 cease-fire, Azerbaijan’s apprehension vis-à-vis Russia’s intentions 
precluded an immediate settlement, and Russia’s disdain for a multinational 
peacekeeping force drained all momentum that could have been used to bring the conflict 
to a close.333  Furthermore, Russia’s close ties with Armenia have damaged its credibility 
as an honest broker.  Consequently, Russian attempts at unilateral mediation, since the 
1994 cease-fire, have not been as productive as was seen in Key West in 2001.  In June 
2010, at a summit hosted in St. Petersburg, President Medvedev presented proposals 
drawn up by Moscow without consultation with the other co-chairs of the Minsk 
Group.334  Azerbaijan dismissed this modified version of the Madrid principles without 
discussion, as they immediately perceived the proposal as favoring Armenian interests.335  
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After Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev cut his visit short, government officials in 
Armenia alleged that he ordered attacks on Armenian outposts in Karabakh out of 
frustration.336 
The philosophy that drove Russian foreign policy, one of Soviet era military 
ambition backed by a Russian imperialist legacy, lasted decades after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, and only recently has it begun to change course.337  Even within the last 
decade, Russian military leaders, seeking to maintain power in the region, held firmly to 
maintaining the status quo.338  A discernible change in Russian attitude toward the 
conflict began just after the turn of the century as the Russian military moved out of the 
foreign policy arena, and the foreign ministry began taking on a larger role.339  The 
decade that followed showed significantly more engagement by Russia, with President 
Medvedev making more than 10 serious attempts at mediating.340  Russia’s increased 
involvement led many critics of U.S. policy to argue that the United States had ceded to 
Moscow and “outsourced” its role as mediator to Russia.341   
While the Russian approach to the conflict may have changed, its interest in 
resolution was fleeting.  Whereas Medvedev likely saw this undertaking as a chance for 
personal glory, Putin currently has no such interests.342  Putin’s flippant attitude toward 
conflict resolution, clearly displayed in a February 2007 press conference opining the 
benefits of restoring the Agdamski Portvein factory in Armenian controlled Azerbaijan, 
which produced Soviet era wine popular among alcoholics, indicates that this is not high 
on his list of priorities while in office.343  Consequently, Putin’s pointedly arrogant and 
paternalistic attitude has brought him to personal conflict with the presidents of both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan.  Ilham Aliyev fell out of favor with Putin in 2006 after refusing 
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to restrict gas supplies to Georgia, and Serzh Sarkisyan’s falling out occurred in 2009, in 
the wake of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, when he awarded Georgian President Mikhail 
Saakashvili a medal of honor in Yerevan.344  
Russia would benefit in the long-term from a stable peace between Azerbaijan 
and Armenia, but mediations as they have stood for the last two decades have been a 
zero-sum game.  An internationally cohesive and rigid approach to settlement with 
United Nations backing may be able to compel cooperation between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, but would certainly destroy Russian credibility in Armenia.345  Russia has 
clear interests in maintaining relations with both countries, but considering its 
relationship with Georgia, following the events of 2008, Russia cannot afford to lose 
Armenian loyalty while attempting to foster better relations with Azerbaijan.346  Russia’s 
seemingly counterintuitive interest in American involvement in conflict negotiation has 
been to share the burden of taking sides.347  While Russia’s status as a protector of 
Armenia has been enough to keep Azerbaijan from launching another military offensive, 
Moscow has adopted a policy that takes advantage of the conflict in favor of Russian 
interests. 
By playing on the interests and fears of both sides, Russia has managed the 
conflict to its advantage in what Anar Vliyev refers to as “controlled chaos.”348  Russia 
was able to maintain a military presence in Azerbaijan until 2013 and continues troop 
rotations to Armenia.349  It continues to sell arms to both sides and has been effective in 
preventing both states from integrating with NATO or the European Union.   
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The level of Russian control over this conflict, and Armenia in particular, is 
illustrated by the events surrounding a 22 July 2013 meeting with the European 
Commission in Yerevan to negotiate the terms of a deep and comprehensive free trade 
area (DCFTA) that would integrate Armenia into the EU market.  Leading up to the 
conference, on 18 June, Russia announced that it would begin delivering $1 billion in 
weapons to Azerbaijan including tanks, artillery, and rockets.350  Weeks later, on 7 July, 
Russian state-controlled Gazprom increased the price of gas exported to Armenia by 
more than 50 percent, forcing the Armenian government to subsidize consumer gas prices 
to avoid protest and prompting officials to consider transferring its remaining 20 percent 
stake in pipeline ownership to Gazprom to secure future concessions.351  In the week 
preceding the economic summit, the Russian court made a spectacle of an Armenian 
Karabakh War veteran brought on trial for allegedly causing a serious traffic accident 
near Moscow.  The man was heavily medicated when he was brought before the 
nationally televised court wearing a colorful flowery women’s bathrobe.352  On 24 July, 
Armenia reached an agreement on the terms of a trade agreement with the EU that was to 
be signed in November.  The following week, news reports circulated that an Armenian 
soldier killed an innocent Turkish shepherd when he momentarily crossed the border to 
retrieve a lost sheep.353 The same day, the Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a 
formal statement condemning Armenia for the incident.354  A day later, it was released 
that it was a Russian unit that was providing security along the Armenia-Turkey border, 
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and it was a Russian soldier who killed the shepherd.355  If the timing of these events was 
not choreographed by Moscow, it is indeed surprising that they remind Yerevan of every 
element of leverage that the Kremlin maintains over Armenia at this critical juncture.  
Armenia’s military balance vis-à-vis Azerbaijan and Turkey is sustained by Russia, 
Russia controls Armenia’s economy and energy resources, and the substantial Armenian 
diaspora in Russia is firmly under Putin’s thumb.  Just six weeks after the 
groundbreaking agreement with the European Union, and under overwhelming pressure 
from Moscow, Yerevan announced that it would be joining the Russian-led Customs 
Union, a move that ended the possibility of EU integration.356 
F. BARRIERS TO MEDIATION 
Regional stability in the South Caucasus would bring greater prosperity to all 
countries in the long run, and each of the large powers discussed above has something 
unique to gain from a peace settlement.  Nevertheless, neighboring states interests, woven 
into the conflict, have polarized the region and complicated resolution.  While the 
mutually beneficial alliances that have developed out of the conflict have become 
inseparable from the dispute itself, the aligned interests of larger powers have 
significantly different objectives.  To the United States, Turkey, Russia, and Iran, these 
two small states in the South Caucasus represent access to an energy source, strategic 
influence in the region, or both.  To Armenia and Azerbaijan these partnerships provide 
the political support, economic resources, and military hardware that keep this conflict 
alive in the hearts and minds of the Armenian and Azeri populations, giving each country 
hope that one day they will be victorious.   
In a 1999 study published in the Journal of Peace Research, Moorad Mooradian 
and Daniel Druckman from the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George 
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Mason University investigate the effectiveness of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate 
compared to pre-conflict mediation.  Their research covers events in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict from 1990 to 1995, ranking the effectiveness of resolution efforts 
against the level of conflict to determine their correlation.  The study’s focus on pre-
conflict mediation has new relevance as the current cease-fire nears its twentieth 
anniversary with both sides still postured for war.  As nearly a generation has passed, this 
dispute is assumably in a new pre-conflict stage.  Mooradin and Druckman’s conclusion, 
in ironic contradiction to the title of the journal, was that “timing for conflict settlement 
depends on raising the level of conflict until a stalemate is reached and then begins to 
hurt.”357  They contend that there are regrettably few cases of international conflicts that 
have been settled before they escalated, and that finding common ground on which to 
mediate is just short of impossible when each side believes that victory is attainable.358  
They pose a lofty challenge for mediators: to recognize circumstances, when they arise, 
in which each side may perceive more benefit in settling than going to war.359  
G. CONCLUSION 
While regional alliances and power politics have created a mediation-stifling 
status quo, the root of this conflict is ultimately a dispute over territory between two 
nations; only an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan will lead to the definitive 
conclusion to this era of conflict.  For this reason, some critics argue that discussion of 
regional power politics takes the burden off the parties to the conflict, allowing them to 
blame others for stalled efforts toward peace.360  While this possibility exists, it is 
impossible to accurately frame this problem without taking into account the influence that 
larger powers have on peaceful resolution. 
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Recalling from the last chapter, the overarching strategy for Azerbaijan appears to 
be winning an arms race that would crush Armenia’s economy and force it into 
submission.  Armenia’s goal is to outlast Azerbaijan’s oil boon and let the occupation of 
Karabakh stand the test of time to become an internationally accepted norm.  Each 
nation’s pursuit of its goals relies directly on support from its international partners.  
Azerbaijan’s strategy is fueled by international oil and gas trade as well as weapons 
purchased abroad.  The main obstacle standing in the way of Azerbaijan taking its 
territory back is Armenia’s alliance with Russia.  Armenia’s strategy depends on its 
ability to keep its economy afloat while maintaining its security, a challenge that is made 
difficult by its closed border with Turkey and continental Europe beyond.  In this regard, 
Armenia is heavily reliant on Russia for most aspects of its survival.  Polarized alliances 
have fueled the strategic goals of both sides of the conflict and created the military 
apparatus that both sides believe is suitable for victory.  Military confidence, economic 
support, and political legitimacy afforded by international partners sustain the structure of 
the status quo at the national level that keeps ruling elites in power.  
International mediation will only be effective when both Armenia and Azerbaijan 
believe that unilateral victory is unattainable or prohibitively costly and that a diplomatic 
settlement is more favorable than maintaining the present status quo.  Countervailing 
interests between Russia and western powers in multiparty mediation has prevented the 
either mediator from developing the leverage required to create favorable conditions for a 
mediated settlement.  As recent events illustrate, Russia has significant direct leverage 
over Armenia, but its leverage over Azerbaijan is limited.  The United States and Europe 
have greater leverage over Azerbaijan but certainly not to the extent that Russia controls 
Armenia.  Powerful active mediation would require extensive diplomatic cooperation and 
collaboration between Russia and western powers represented by the United States as 
well as the European Union, which has been completely unengaged in conflict resolution 
aside from contributions to the OSCE.  The obvious obstacles to such cooperation are the 
very roots of the problem of conflicting interests that are outlined in this chapter.  The 
alliances and partnerships that were established early in this conflict have woven this 
dispute into the fabric of a larger regional competition based on power and influence. 
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While the OSCE Minsk Group has failed to bring this conflict to a close, its 
efforts have not been in vain.  The Minsk Group has maintained dialogue and kept the 
diplomatic structure alive that has provided a political outlet through which both 
countries can air their grievances on the international stage without escalating the 
conflict.  A more active approach to mediation, as suggested by Ambrosio, could produce 
substantial gains when the time is right, but the current situation precludes this.  Active 
engagement in this environment is likely to tarnish the credibility of the mediator only to 
further polarize regional alliances, as seen in both the Zurich Protocols of 2009 and the 
St. Petersburg Summit of 2010.  Regional dynamics may eventually change due to 
circumstances anyone has yet to imagine.  The U.S. State Department’s leading role in 
facilitating the Zurich Protocols, although unsuccessful, was an attempt to accelerate such 
a change in the regional status quo.  As unproductive as it appears in this case, diplomacy 
must not be put on hold.  A structure for talks must remain in place and mediators need to 
be ready to act decisively when the conditions are right.  Ongoing passive mediation by 
the Minsk Group can keep diplomatic channels open and diffuse interstate tension while 
maintaining a watchful eye on regional shifts of power. 
Illuminating the national interests of regional powers reveals a collective action 
dilemma that may one day lead to the regions collective undoing.  It is well within the 
power and purview of countries neighboring this conflict to construct foreign policy that 
would facilitate reconciliation, yet collectively these nations lack the political will to 
formulate peace at the expense of their own related interests.  Most experts agree that the 
most catastrophic of possible outcomes, Russia and Turkey going to war over this 
conflict, is currently unimaginable.  While this geographically strategic region has a 
history of bloody conquest, regional alliances appear to be temperate enough for the time 
being to withstand conflict without leading to a larger regional war.  Nevertheless, this 
conflict is a casus belli in waiting that, if left unresolved long enough, could be the spark 








VI. CONCLUSION: UNDERSTANDING INTRACTABILITY AND 
CHARTING A COURSE TO RESOLUTION 
The seeds of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute were planted in an isolated area 
between two small nations at a time when conditions were ripe for ethnic turmoil, but the 
conflict that has grown now casts a shadow over an entire region.  The conflict has 
evolved at the hands of political and economic elites, transformed in a society that 
embraces it as an element of identity, and developed an international character that places 
it in the midst of polarized global politics.  As the roots of the conflict have grown clearer 
over time, it is also apparent that addressing just the origin of the conflict will no longer 
be sufficient to bring about resolution.  Issues of power, wealth, identity, and influence 
are interwoven between the elite, society, and international actors.  As the conflict has 
matured and a status quo has solidified, domestic and international actors have 
maneuvered to manipulate the prevailing structure for their own benefit.  Those who 
benefit from the status quo have created additional layers of intransigence that make the 
conflict ever more intractable.   
Analysis of the conflict as a whole indicates that two conditions must be met 
simultaneously in order for third party mediation to succeed in bringing about a peaceful 
resolution.  First, both Armenia and Azerbaijan must experience democratic reform that 
creates transparency in government and empowers civil society to take part in a liberal 
political process.  Second, there must be a shift in the geopolitical balance of power that 
reduces the influence of bipolar alliances, diminishes Russia’s control over Armenia, and 
provides the conditions in which mediators can cooperate in establishing leverage in 
mediation.  Until these events take place it will be impossible to break the bonds of 
intractability that keep these two nations entrenched in a frozen conflict.  
The prospect of these conditions aligning in the near future is bleak, and it would 
be safe to assert that the continued longevity of this dispute will be measured in decades 
rather than years.  Certainly one might surmise that the purveyor of any such prediction 
could have no more political sense than a weatherman in San Diego.  One stands a better 
than average chance of predicting tomorrow’s weather in southern California by simply 
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forecasting the same conditions as today.  Nonetheless, this projection is not heedlessly 
pessimistic; it is based on the complex linkages that have developed between the three 
prominent levels of this conflict as it has matured.  Moreover, conventional approaches to 
mediation and conflict resolution are principally one-dimensional and shortsighted.  
One-dimensional approaches to resolution are typically based on narrow theories 
of international relations that do not account for all aspects of the conflict.  While these 
theories are sound when analyzed independently, it has been difficult or impossible to 
develop policy that simultaneously addresses the motivational aspects of all three 
disparate yet interconnected levels.  Specifically, limitations imposed by the structure of 
the international system create obstacles to overt influence on the elite and national levels 
by international actors.  International mediation is focused on finding a resolution that 
suits the interests of the states in terms of security, power, and influence.  Talk of 
territorial swaps and peacekeeping forces fit this paradigm.  Other approaches have 
explored resolution at the level of the nation and society and focus on informal diplomacy 
and the prospect of economic integration.  Few options are on the table for international 
actors to deal with reform at the level of the elite that would not be considered blatantly 
aggressive.  Moreover, the role of the elite in the process has been largely overlooked or 
misunderstood by international mediators.  Due to the interconnectedness of the three 
prominent levels of the conflict, dealing with any level independently has been 
obfuscated by its connections to other levels for which a one-dimensional approach is 
inadequate.  Figure 1 outlines the major linkages between the different levels of the 





Figure 1.  Diagram of linkages between levels of analysis 
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The introduction to this thesis proposed that the structure that has enveloped this 
conflict as it matured has created the conditions of intractability that have prevented 
effective third party mediation.  A review of literature on the conflict illustrates the extent 
to which various scholars focus exclusively on single aspects of the conflict in search of 
resolution.  The numerous perspectives are all uniquely valuable and applicable within 
the realm of the specific paradigm for which they were written.  Nonetheless, when 
applied to the conflict in all of its complexity, none of them are completely adequate to 
bring about change. 
Three basic paradigms were introduced in chapter two that provide the theoretical 
background for framing the problem through levels of analysis in terms of the elite, the 
nation and society, and the international system.  The concept of intractability was 
presented as a condition that can result from a conflict resonating at more than one level.  
The importance of third party mediation was explained as a historically necessary 
component in resolving intractable conflicts, as was the difficulty in gaining and 
maintaining leverage with multiple mediators. 
The historical narrative of the conflict in chapter three showed the birth of the 
conflict on both sides at the levels of the elite, the nation, and the international system.  It 
illustrates how an ethnic conflict based on perceived injustice and insecurity at local 
levels in society grew to international stature and how elites rose to positions of influence 
and power.  As the war ended in ceasefire in 1994 a basic structure was in place that was 
reinforced over the following two decades that made the conflict more intractable with 
time. 
Analysis focused on the levels of the elite and the nation, in chapter four, 
explained the internal structure of the conflict in both Armenia and Azerbaijan and the 
contemporary linkages between the levels of analysis.  Elites in both countries have 
grown to rely on external threats of the other to maintain legitimacy in their respective 
partial democracies that hinge on authoritarianism.  Political competition takes the form 
of propaganda and bellicose rhetoric that continues to cement this threat in the minds of 
their electorate.  The arms race that has developed between these two countries reinforces 
the real threat of war while consuming money and resources that might otherwise be 
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spent on development in the civil sector, building democratic institutions, and 
empowering civil society.  Society has remained postured for war for so long that 
militarism is entrenched in the sociopsychological infrastructure of each nation, and the 
conflict has become part of their respective national identities.  The structure of the 
conflict at the international level thwarts the possibility of peace through economic 
integration, and the blockade on Armenia contributes to the sense of collective suffering 
that fuels resentment.  Efforts at informal diplomacy gain little ground in an autocratic 
environment where moderate voices are considered treasonous and government policies 
prevent freedom of expression.  Meanwhile, international actors work within the structure 
of the status quo to provide the ruling regimes of both nations the support and resources 
they need to stay in power. 
At the international level, as discussed in the last chapter, alliances formed as the 
status quo solidified such that the structure on the global stage parallels the conflict 
between these two nations.  A bipolar structure, reminiscent of the cold war, has 
developed where Russia’s sphere of influence is matched against western intervention.  
Azerbaijan is allied with Turkey and shares interests with Europe, the United States, and 
Israel, while Armenia is critically dependent on support from Russia and Iran.  The 
economic, military, and political support channeled to both conflicting nation supports 
the interests of larger nations in what amounts to a polarized political skirmish within the 
larger geopolitical competition.  By virtue of proximity, Russia’s stronger geopolitical 
interests have not only hampered resolution, it has strengthened the status quo and fueled 
the conflict in order to maintain its regional influence. 
Mediation has not failed due to a flawed approach or lack of involvement by 
mediators.  Mediation has failed because of the self-reinforcing structure of the status quo 
that has developed out of the conflict.  At the international level this is characterized by 
competition among mediators and would-be mediators for power, wealth, and regional 
influence, but it goes deeper than the international level.  Each of the three levels of this 
conflict reinforces the others.  Attempting to resolve the dispute at one level only creates 
greater pressure from the other two levels to restore the balance.  Moreover, the process  
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of third party mediation is limited in influence to the international level and does not 
affect the majority of the issues at hand.  In the current environment there is nothing more 
an international mediator can do to bring about peace. 
Mediators who maintain a dialogue between these two nations have been 
successful only in their ability to prevent another war, which in itself is a worthy 
accomplishment.  Despite their conflicting regional aspirations and their individual gains 
from maintaining the status quo, neighboring countries still want to prevent another war.  
Even Russia, with its dominating strategy of maintaining regional supremacy by 
controlling the conflict, has considered the strategic balance of power between these two 
nations in all of its dealings.  Russia has long recognized the intractability of the conflict 
and rather than expending resources to bring about peace has instead chosen to capitalize 
on the conflict for its own interests.  The problem lies in the tyranny of small decisions 
discussed in Chapter II.  International actors each make a series of small decisions based 
on their own short-term interests regarding power and security that create obstacles to 
further resolution and create conditions in which the conflict could again erupt in war.  
The forum for mediation itself has become a series of small decisions that have 
cumulatively contributed to continued intractability.  
Continuing mediation under the conditions of the current status quo is a double-
edged sword that no mediator can back away from.  Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 
acknowledge that “mediation will not flourish in an environment where the major 
powers—for understandable and strategically cogent reasons—have other priorities.”361   
Mediators engage in mediation for their own national interests, but in the case of 
Nagorno-Karabakh these interests hinge largely on the realist principle of relative gains.  
The underlying national interests of opposing mediators relates directly to maintaining 
influence at the expense of the other in what amounts to a zero-sum equation.  In essence, 
the mediation process is simply a continuation of the conflict on another stage.  Under 
these conditions, the parties to the conflict have the upper hand in the mediation process 
and mediators cannot gain the leverage required to make progress.  Meanwhile, 
                                                 
361 Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, Taming Intractable Conflicts, 33. 
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mediation has continued on the surface for decades with no chance of success.  Proposals 
are made and summarily discarded, political capital is wasted, diplomatic bridges are 
built only to be set ablaze before the next round of talks, and the media cycle is an eternal 
rerun.  One course of action in such circumstances might be to let the talks cool and 
preserve mediation for a time when conditions are ripe.  Of course, this would require 
collective action at a global scale.  It would require all major international players to 
forsake their strategic interests in this region until both sides are willing to compromise.  
Moreover, Russia’s role in Armenia is currently a significant balancing force that if 
removed could tip the balance of power and lead to aggression from Azerbaijan.  
Crocker, Hampson, and Aall contend that suspending mediation can only be effective if 
the mediator has substantial leverage over both sides.362  Nonetheless, as mediation 
continues it grows stale and increasingly ineffective at performing its intended function.  
Continued open resistance to compromise in international mediation resonates at the 
national level and has developed a pattern that is now virtually impossible to break. 
As discussed in chapters four and five, mediation plays an important part in 
conflict management even though it has not been able to narrow the gap between the two 
national positions.  The political outlet and international audience that mediation provides 
has so far been sufficient to supplant military maneuvering with political posturing and 
provide a notional path toward peace.  Mediation is bound to continue for the 
aforementioned reasons, but there remains some latitude for mediators to determine their 
level of involvement.  In the interest of protecting the sanctity of the mediation process 
and reestablishing credibility among mediators, it is critical that a careful balance be 
maintained in which the level of mediator commitment is strictly limited to that which is 
required to keep all participants at the table and prevent escalation of hostilities. Under 
the current geopolitical conditions and the sociopolitical environment in both Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, there should be no real expectation that mediation will yield resolution. 
There will come a day when conditions are right for meaningful mediation, but if the 
tools of diplomacy are dulled through improper use they will be unable to perform their 
functions when it is most critical. 
                                                 
362 Ibid., 125. 
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The principles of liberal democracy will be the foundation upon which a lasting 
peace will one day be constructed.  Therefore, responsible international actors must 
prioritize democratic reform and conformity with international norms over continued 
attempts to find a short-term solution through continued rounds of mediation.  Incentives 
must be developed that tie the short-term interests of both nations to their long-term 
progress along a path toward democracy.  The challenge presented to strategists and 
policy makers in the years and decades ahead should be to develop a series of 
incentivized steps for each nation that can provide the conditions suitable for the 
development of a civil society in which moderate voices can be heard.  Such a program 
must be a coherent plan rather than a series of isolated ad hoc policies, and it must be 
gradual and subtle enough not to upset the perceived interests of other nations.  This will 
not be an easy task, but its contribution to lasting peace will be far more substantial than 
what has been seen in the last 20 years. 
In seeking resolution to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the international 
community must raise its eyes to the horizon.  There is no short or medium-term solution 
to this dispute, and pretending to look for one only lends credibility to the claims of both 
sides.  If the last 20 years have taught the people of both nations anything, it is that the 
status quo is survivable.  It is survivable because it is supported by an ideology that feeds 
on fear and suffering.  It is survivable because those in power can stay in power through 
repression and support of the international community.  It survives at the international 
level because of conflicting national interests tied to the land upon which it rests or the 
resources therein.  Both democratic reform and a geopolitical shift in the balance of 
power must take place before mediation will be effective, but democratic reform is 
measured in generations while changes in geopolitical power can occur rapidly.  Peace in 
this region requires that groundwork be laid well in advance and the tools of diplomacy 
be kept in working order so that when conditions are favorable a solution of compromise 
is possible. 
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APPENDIX REGIONAL MAPS 
 
Figure 2.  Map of Nagorno-Karabakh363
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Figure 3.  Map of South Caucus364
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